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On 19 September 2002, dissatisfied soldiers in Côte d’Ivoire attempted to overthrow Laurent 
Gbagbo’s regime. In response, France rapidly mobilised its military forces, once again 
intervening in one of its former colonies. This intervention is all the more surprising given the 
recent and important reforms in France’s Africa policy; reforms whichled tothe increased 
disengagement of the French military in Africa.In light of this conundrum, this thesis seeks to 
understand why France pursued intervention in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002. Moreover, given these 
wide ranging reforms, I seek to understand the extent to which France’s intervention in 2002, 
indeed, represents something new, or is simply another manifestation of France’s traditional way 
of doing this in Africa. 
 
In answering these research questions, this thesis combines both quantitative analysis and an in-
depth case study of French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. In applying the results from the analysis 
to the case study, I find that the French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire is largely consistent with, 
and indeed indicative of, France’s historical modus operandi in sub-Saharan Africa. In sum, I 
show how France has a plethora of important interests in the Côte d’Ivoire, interests which are 
shaped by its strong historical relationship with Côte d’Ivoire and which strongly influenced 
French intervention in 2002. 
 
Moreover, circumstances surrounding the 2002 failed coup attempt, notably the deteriorating 
situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the empowerment of Jacques Chirac and even the mistrust between 
Chirac and Gbagbo created the conditions which further fostered military interventions. These 
factors, it is shown, are largely consistent with the general trends of French intervention in sub-
Saharan Africa, thus indicating that, despite important French reforms leading up to the 2002 
intervention, very little has changed regarding French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan 
Africa. As such, the results from this thesis indicate that when one of France’s important former 
African colonies is perceived to be under threat, France is bound by historical responsibility and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Problem 
On 19 September 2002, a group of middle-ranked soldiers in Cote d’Ivoire attempted to 
overthrow Laurent Gbagbo’s regime. Ascending to power in an election shrouded in controversy, 
in conditions he himself described as ‘calamitous’,1 Gbagbo held onto power for roughly two 
years before dissatisfied soldiers attempted to remove him from office. While the initial coup 
plot in the south, notably in the economic capital Abidjan, failed to oust Gbagbo, belligerents 
managed to occupy large swathes of northern Cote d’Ivoire, including the country’s second 
largest city Bouake.2 
 
The rebellion, initially under the auspices of the Mouvement patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire 
(MPCI), later merged with MPIGO (Mouvement Populaire Ivorien du Grand Ouest) and MPJ 
(Mouvement pour la Paix et la Justice) to form the Forces Nouvelles (FN).3 This increasingly 
confident rebel group found in the marginalised northern population a strong support-base, one 
which shared similar grievances and ethno-religious commonalities with the rebels.4 
Consequently, the insurgency established itself in the northern half of Cote d’Ivoire, where they 
were to remain in control for almost a decade. Thus, beginning with the initial coup attempt, and 
after a series of failed negotiations, the country remained partitioned until 2009, when the 
Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (OPA) was signed, officially reuniting the country.5 
 
Throughout the Ivorian crisis, France played an undeniably important role.6 Rapidly responding 
to the crisis, France, on September 22 2002, launched Opération Licorne (Unicorn), deploying 
                                               
1K. Martial Frindéthié, Francophone African cinema: history, culture, politics and theory. (Jefferson: McFarland, 
2009):154  
2 Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams, "The new politics of protection?, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the responsibility 
to protect, "International Affairs 87.4 (2011): 830 
3 Ibid 
4 Kathrin Heitz, Through the Prism of the Cinquantenaire: Cote d’Ivoire between Refondation and Houphouet’s 
legacy,In Francophone Africa at Fifty. edited by Tony Chafer and Alexander Keese, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2013): 222. 
5 Mike McGovern, Making war in Côte d'Ivoire, (C. Hurst: London, 2011): 3; John F. McCauley. "Measuring and 
Reducing Religious Bias in Post‐Conflict Zones: Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire." Political Psychology 35.2 (2014): 
267-289. 
6 The Ivorian crisis (2002 -2011) was perhaps not one long crisis but a series of micro-crises which eventually ended 
within the toppling of Gbagbo. Thus, the analysis of the Ivorian conflict resembles McGovern’s idea that the 
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600 troops in the hastily deteriorating situation. This relatively small deployment grew rapidly: 
by January 2003 French deployment had increased to 2571 troops, 14 helicopters, 3 transport 
planes and 172 troops from Senegal.7 A few months later, French boots on the ground numbered 
4000 and by November there were roughly 5300 French troops in Côte d’Ivoire, the largest 
single deployment of French forces in Africa since the Algerian war.8 This sudden decision to 
deploy troops to the increasingly worsening situation raises important questions as to why the 
Élysée acted with all possible haste to intervene in Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
Moreover, in the 1990s, France was undergoing important changes to its hitherto consistent 
African policy, often referred to as Françafrique. The death of two key figures of Françafrique 
policy, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the long-serving Ivorian President, and Jacque Foccart, 
France’s ‘Monsieur Afrique’, was a further sign of fundamental changes to comein French-
Africa relations. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union, changing international dynamics, 
France’s infamous role in the Rwandan genocide, as well as domestic and global dissatisfaction 
with France’s Africa policy led to significant reforms.9 Within France itself, Lionel Jospin, the 
socialist Prime Minister from 1997-2002, pushed for fundamental changes to traditional 
‘Gaullist’ French policy vis-à-vis sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, in the late 1990s, coinciding with 
increased instability in Côte d’Ivoire, fundamental reforms occurred in France’s military, 
economic and political relations with Africa, with Prime Minister Jospin calling for a ‘new 
partnership’ with Africa.10 
 
Of note, France sought to reform its security policy vis-a-vis Africa, notably through the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Ivoirian crises were marked by neither war nor peace, only episodes and instances of both (See McGovern, Making 
War in Côte d’Ivoire) 
7 Assemblé Nationale,Commission de la Défense et des Forces Armées. Compte Rendu (Report) No. 26 (Paris: 21 
January, 2003), accessed July 13, 2015,http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cr-cdef/02-
03/c0203026.asp#P36_221; Bruno Charbonneau. France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2008a): 160. 
8Charbonneau. France and the New Imperialism, 160 
9 For more on detailed explanations as to why France’s implemented fundamental changes to it Africa policy See: 
Shaun Gregory. "The French Military in Africa: Past and Present,"African Affairs, 99 (2000); Xavier Renou, "A new 
French policy for Africa?", Journal of Contemporary African Studies 20.1 (2002); Peter J Schraeder. "Cold War to 
Cold Peace: Explaining US‐French Competition in Francophone Africa." Political Science Quarterly 115.3 (2000); 
Rachel Utley, "Not to do less but to do better: French military policy in Africa," International Affairs 78.1 (2002); 
Rachel Utley, "Franco-African Military Relations: Meeting the Challenges of Globalisation?, " Modern and 
Contemporary France 13.1 (2005); Institute for Peace and Security Studies, "Managing Peace and Security in 
Africa: Approaches to Intervention in African Conflicts,"(Addis Ababa University, 2012): 134 
10 Lionel Jospin," La Politique de défense de la France", Défense Nationale, 53.11 (1997): 3–14. 
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reduction of military personal on the continent, and increased multilateralism of its military 
responsibilities (notably through RECAMP11).12 Economically, France sought to redefine its 
economic policy vis-à-vis Africa, namely through the devaluation of the Communauté 
Financière Africaine (CFA) Franc and French aid reforms.13 While these policy shifts 
represented important changes to French-Africa relations, many argue that, by-and-large, not 
much changed with regards to Franco-African relations, and while France has certainly 
restructured its policy, its fundamental actions vis-à-vis Africa and its motives for such action 
have remained largely consistent.14 
 
Yet, one strong indication that France was perhaps shifting away from its old habits was France’s 
response, or lack thereof, to the 1999 coup d’état in Côte d’Ivoire. By 1999, Henry Konan Bédié, 
the successor to the deceased Houphouët-Boigny, became increasingly unpopular internationally 
and amongst Ivoirians. In response, Bédié was overthrown by General Robert Guéï in a 
relatively blood-less coup d’état. According to the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 
France could have easily rescued the Bédié regime.15 Yet, other than issuing a statement of 
condemnation, France remained passive choosing instead not to intervene and restore Bédié to 
power, as many observers would have predicted.  
 
For some, the lack of intervention was indicative of France’s disengagement from Africa’s 
internal affairs, notably through the stern objections of Jospin, who championed French “neither 
interference nor indifference” policy.16 While reports suggest that President Chirac dangled with 
notions of intervention, the political ramifications of saving an unpopular President, it is argued, 
dissuaded Chirac from taking action.17 Indeed, the cohabitation between Chirac’s conservatives 
                                               
11Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix 
12Utley, "Franco-African Military Relations", 29/30; Richard Banégas, "France’s Intervention Policy in Africa Seen 
from Below,"European Review of International Studies 1 (2014): 62. 
13Ibid 
14See: Tony Chafer,"Franco-African Relations: No Longer so Exceptional?,"African Affairs101 (2002); Renou, "A 
new French policy for Africa", 24; Charbonneau,France and the New Imperialism; Marco Wyss, "The Gendarme 
stays in Africa: France's military role in Côte d'Ivoire," African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review 3.1 (2013): 88 
15 Institute for Peace and Security Studies, "Managing Peace and Security in Africa", 134 
16 See: Richard Banégas and Bruno Losch,"La Côte d'Ivoire au bord de l'implosion,"Politique africaine 87(2002/3): 
157; Tony Chafer,"Chirac and ‘la Françafrique’: No Longer a Family Affair"Modern & Contemporary France, 13:1 
(2005): 16; Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Managing Peace and Security in Africa, 134; Wyss, "The 
Gendarme stays in Africa",  88/89 
17Wyss, "The Gendarme stays in Africa”, 88/89 
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and Jospin’s ‘progressive’ Socialists, and by extension their divergent views of French Africa 
policy, effectively paralysed the decision-making abilities of the French state, leading to the 
success of the coup.18 
 
With right-wing elements in Chirac inner circle, notably within the Élysée’s African cell and 
from Michel Dupuch, pushing for intervention and Jospin’s Socialists seeking disengagement 
from African intervention, decisions as to how best to respond to the 1999 coup d’état reached a 
stalemate. While important, others suggest that the acquisition of power by General Guéï was 
perceived to serve French interests far more than Bédié ever did.19 For example, Smith describes 
how ‘he (Chirac) knew Bédié wasn’t deserving of (the risk of) French intervention20 while 
Kroslak notes how France decided to abandon Bédié in favour of Guéï, who after training in 
France, had established good relations with the French political and military establishment.21 
This is all to say that, decision-makers in France, by-and-large, perhaps felt that Guéï would 
serve the interest of France more astutely than his predecessor, and as such, seemed a safer bet in 
securing French interests.22 
 
France’s lack of intervention in 1999, for whatever reason,thus prompted many to believe that 
France was perhaps removing itself from direct military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, 
immediately following the 19 September 2002 attempted coup, France intervened in Côte 
d’Ivoire.23 Given the nature of the research problem aforementioned, I seek to understand the 
motives behind France’s 2002 intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
  
                                               
18Boubacar N'Diaye,Still Getting Away With it: France’s Africa Defense and Security policy, in Routledge 
Handbook of African Security, edited by James J. Hentz (Routledge: London, 2014): 308 
19Daniela Kroslak, France’s Policy towards Africa: Continuity or Change?,In Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, 
eds. Africa in International Politics: External involvement on the continent. (London: Routledge, 2004): 
61–82; Charbonneau,France and the New Imperialism, 158 
20Stephen Smith, "La France Dans la Crise Ivoirienne: ni Ingérence, ni Indifférence, mais Indolence Post-
Coloniale", in Côte d’Ivoire, L’année terrible 1999–2000, edited by Marc Le Pape and Claudine Vidal (Paris: 
Karthala, 2002):312 
21Kroslak, France’s Policy towards Africa, 79 
22Ibid 
23 Fiona McFarlane & Mark Malan, "Crisis and Response in the Central African Republic: A New Trend in African 
Peacekeeping?",  African Security Review, 7:2 (1998): 49 
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1.2 Research Question 
This thesis thus seeks to determine why France rapidly deployed its military apparatus in Côte 
d’Ivoire. The primary research question of this thesis is thus: 
 
1. Why did France intervene in the Ivorian crisis in 2002?  
 
Certainly, France has been no stranger to military engagements on the continent as it has 
launched more interventions than any other state in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa (See Table 
1). As such, France has often been labelled the intervener par excellence in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and indeed the Gendarme or policeman of Africa.24 In response to the frequency of French 
intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, a plethora of scholars have sought to understand the nature 
and rationale for France’s enduring interactions with and interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. 
While France, leading up to its 2002 intervention, was thought to be actively disengaging from 
traditional interference in Africa’s internal affairs,25 its sudden intervention in 2002 suggests 
otherwise. Taking such claims into account, and in further developing a robust understanding of 
French military intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, I ask several supplementary questions. 
Specifically: 
 
1. What are the general trends of French motives for intervention in sub-
Saharan Africa? 
2. To what extent does France’s 2002 intervention in Côte d’Ivoire differ from 
these trends? 
 
This thesis thus attempts to ascertain French motives for intervening in the Côte d’Ivoire. In 
complementing the primary research question, I ask whether this intervention is indeed 
indicative of France’s traditional motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, of which there 
are many, or whether this intervention truly represents a substantive change in French policy vis-
à-vis sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
                                               
24 France has long been accused of being the Gendarme (policeman) of Africa – intervening more than any other 
state in the domestic affairs of African states: See Victor‐Manuel Vallin. "France as the Gendarme of Africa, 1960–
2014." Political Science Quarterly 130.1 (2015): 79-101. 
25Jospin, "La politique de défense de la France." ; Chafer, "Chirac and ‘la Françafrique’", 20; Renou, "The French 




To understand why France intervened in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the difference between this 
intervention and other French interventions in sub-Saharan Africa, I use a mixed-methods 
approach. This approach combines both quantitative and qualitative methods and data, and thus 
attempts to merge an intensive case-study (French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire) with large-N 
statistical analysis (general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa).26 The power of 
such an approach is best illustrated by scholars such as Lieberman who, in his seminal work, 
notes that the mixed-method approach ‘combines the statistical analysis of a large sample of 
cases with the in-depth investigation of one or more cases contained within the large sample’.27 
The mixture of such methods thus allows this thesis to utilise the strengths of both quantitative 
and qualitative methods, augmenting the power and reliability of the research findings. 
 
Of note, the quantitative analysis is able to provide answers regarding the general nature and 
motives of French intervention in sub-Saharan African. Through such an analysis, this thesis is 
able to understand and develop an analytical framework of the general trends regarding motives 
for French interventions in sub-Saharan Africa.28 In order to test these hypotheses, the 
UCDP/PRIO (Uppsala Conflict Data Programme/Peace Research Institute Oslo conflict) dataset 
is utilised. Like other well-known conflict datasets, the PRIO dataset focuses specifically on 
tracking armed conflict around the world. This dataset is merged with the International Military 
intervention (IMI) data, which measures interventions in Africa so as to ascertain which conflicts 
experienced French intervention and which did not.  
 
Additionally, data measuring a range of variables are included to test the hypotheses i.e. the 
possible determinants for French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. The literature review in this 
thesis gives rise to various hypotheses which can be quantitatively tested. Of note, I find that 
French economic motives for military intervention are commonplace in the literature. Moreover, 
the historical connections and links between France and sub-Saharan African are argued to 
further increase the likelihood of French intervention. Lastly, humanitarian concerns by French 
                                               
26Evan S Lieberman, "Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for comparative research", American Political 
Science Review 99.03 (2005): 435-452. 
27 Ibid 
28Importantly, the high number of interventions both globally and within Africa (including France) means that an 
adequate sample size exist, which can be tested using statistical analysis. 
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decision-makers are suggested to increase the likelihood of intervention in sub-Saharan Africa.   
In considering these and other hypothesises, I test the extent to they determine and predict the 
likelihood of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In doing this, I am able to understand 
the general trends and patterns of French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Additionally, the 2002 intervention is nested within this large-N analysis and thus provides a 
good case to test the specific findings from the case study to the quantitative framework. 
Moreover, the analysis of a single case-study, nested within the larger sample of military 
interventions in Africa, can complement, but also contradict, the findings of a large-N analysis. 
Small, for example, notes how complementary mixed-methods approaches are able to interpret 
the results of a large-N analysis and are also able to compensate for the weaknesses of large-N 
analysis.29 In this way, the mixed-method approach allows not only an in-depth understanding of 
the specific factors that determined French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, but further allows for 
an analysis of the general trends of French motives for intervention.  
 
The combination of methods allows this thesis to understand the extent to which French 
intervention in Côte d’Ivoire is illustrative of the general trends regarding French motives for 
intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to assess the case of French intervention in Côte 
d’Ivoire, I conduct an in-depth, thematic analysis of a variety of primary and secondary sources. 
Specifically, I utilise government documents emanating from the Foreign Affairs and the 
Defence committees in the French National Assembly to understand the official motives and 
rhetoric surrounding French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. Moreover, I incorporate a wide-range 
of secondary sources in my analysis of French intervention. As much has been written about the 
Ivorian crisis as well as France’s leading role in it, I use a plethora of journal articles, in-depth 
reports, academically-orientated books and web-based articles to develop an understanding of 
French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. By applying the general trends of French intervention, 
established in the quantitative analysis, to the extensive literature around France’s involvement 
in Côte d’Ivoire I am able to establish a strong understanding as to why France decided to 
intervene in Côte d’Ivoire, and by extension the extent to which that intervention resembles or 
                                               
29Mario Luis Small, "How to conduct a mixed methods study: Recent trends in a rapidly growing literature", 
 Sociology 37.1 (2011): 57 - 86 
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differs from the general patterns of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. The mixed-
methodology in this thesis thus provides not only an understanding of French motives of 
intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, but also an understanding of how, if at all, it motives differ when 
compared to the general trends and patterns of French motives for intervention. 
 
1.4 Relevance of the topic 
France is arguably the most important external actor in Africa, especially with regards to military 
interventions (see Table 1). France has intervened in Africa more so than any other state and thus 
it is important to understand the reasons for these continued and large-scale military 
interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. By developing a framework outlining the general trends of 
French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, and using this framework to better 
understand French motives for intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, we can understand the extent to 
which French motives for intervention are indeed changing or if, as one author puts it, French 
intervention is just ‘old wine in new bottles.’30 
Table 1: Foreign Interventions in Africa 1960-200431 
Interveners No. of Interventions % of total interventions in Africa 
France 45 34.9 
USA 26 20.2 
UK 15 11.6 
Belgium 7 5.4 
Portugal 7 5.4 
Other 28 22 
Total 128 100.0 
                                               
30Benedikt Erforth and George Deffner,"Mali: Old Wine in New Bottles." Global Policy Forum, March 18 2013, 
accessed May 25, 2015.https://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52363-mali-old-wine-in-new-
bottles.html?itemid=id#26087 
31.Other states include: Russia, Israel, Cuba, Canada, Germany, Italy, Kuwait, The Netherlands, North Korea, 




Source: International Military Intervention Database 1960-2004 
This change-continuity debate is fundamental to this thesis and can assist in developing an 
understanding of not only Franco-Ivorian relations, but France’s relations with sub-Saharan 
Africa. This is especially important as France has proven time and again that it is willing and 
able to ‘get involved’ in African affairs. Recent interventions in Mali in 2013 (Opération Serval), 
the CAR in 2013 (Opération Sangaris) and in the Sahel belt in 2014 (Opération Barkhane) are 
indicative of this urge to interfere. As such, it is important to understand why France intervenes 
and the extent to which the motivations for these interventions are changing or are remaining 
rooted in traditional rationales.   
 
1.5 Terminology 
‘Military interventions’ – Intervention is often a disputed term within relevant literature. In its 
most broad understanding, most would agree that interventions involve a variety of direct or 
indirect actions by one state that seeks to alter or influence the political, social or economic 
situation of another state. Moreover, there are a range of interventionist actions and tools 
available to states, notably: economic interventions, diplomatic interventions, humanitarian 
interventions and military interventions.32 
 
This thesis, however, focuses specifically on military interventions. Like interventions, there is 
considerable debate over whether military interventions are anything different from military 
invasions, or whether military interventions incorporate other interventions such as humanitarian 
interventions.33 Not ignoring these debates, this thesis treats military interventions as the direct 
movement of troops and soldier from one country to another. As such, this thesis uses the 
definition of Pearson & Baumann’s, who analyse military interventions globally; they 
conceptualise military intervention as ‘the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, 
seaborne, shelling etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or 
                                               
32 For more on types of interventions see: Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Crisis, conflict and 
instability", (Oxford: Pergamon,1989); Michael P O'Keefe and C. A. J. Coady, Righteous violence: the ethics and 
politics of military intervention, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2005) 
33 For example see: Martha Finnemore, The purpose of intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force. 
(Cornell University Press: New York, 2004): 8/9 
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dispute’.34 Moreover, as Regan argues, military interventions can occur on behalf of the target 
government, an opposition force or can remain neutral.35 Lastly, in this thesis the terms ‘target’ 
state and ‘intervener’ state are widely used. The latter refers to states that intervene while the 
former refers to a state that have hosted or have been a target of an intervention.  
 
1.6 Limitations 
The author has a strong command of the French language and as such will utilise various French-
based academic and government sources of information. With that being said, French is a second 
language to the author, and as such, the analysis of French sources may not be as thorough as 
with English sources. 
 
With regards to methodology, this thesis used a mixed-method approach. While incorporating 
both quantitative and qualitative methods and data, the author recognises the pitfalls in such an 
approach. Of note, the author understands the weaknesses of quantitative analysis, especially 
with regards to French motives for interventions, of which there are many. Indeed, by 
quantitatively analysing motives for French intervention, this thesis is in danger of 
oversimplifying results obtained. This is especially the case as French motives for interventions 
have changed considerably over time and space. Moreover, individual interventions differ 
greatly both with regards to the conditions in target states and the intervening state.  
 
Lastly, some variables that may influence French interventions cannot be quantitatively tested. 
For example, there is a set of literature which hypothesises that first-image motives (decision-
maker/individual level) are important determinants of foreign policy decisions.36 It is often 
understood that psychological factors and the thought-making processes of individuals, 
regardless of the other factors, influences the behaviour of states. Certainly, the notion that 
decisions regarding foreign policy behaviour are affected by individual is important for scholars 
of foreign policy and military intervention. Yet, testing such hypothesises quantitatively is 
                                               
34Frederic S Pearson and Robert A. Baumann, International Military Intervention, 1946-1988, (Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1993): 1. 
35 Patrick Regan,"Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts", Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 40.2 (1996): 336-359. 




difficult and largely rests outside the scope of this thesis. With that begin said, in analysing the 
case of Côte d’Ivoire, one is able to analyse the effects and roles of individuals with regards to 
France’s intervention in 2002. While this thesis will attempt to identify key motives for French 
interventions in Africa, this thesis cannot adequately come to terms with all motives and 
rationales for interventions in all target states. Rather, this thesis attempts to view trends in the 
motives of French interventions, trends that are holistically applicable to all cases under analysis.  
 
1.7 Structure of this study 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:In Chapter Two, I discuss the relevant 
literature on why France intervenes in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically focusing on the relatively 
robust set of literature regarding French motives for intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. Of note, I 
consider arguments regarding realist assumptions of intervention and, by extension, how 
France’s ‘Gaullist’ attitudes towards Côte d’Ivoire shaped its motives for intervention. I further 
consider the neo-colonialist argument which suggests that France sought intervention to protect it 
more tangible interests, notably its economic interests. Finally, I consider arguments contending 
that France’s humanitarian concerns in Côte d’Ivoire best explain its 2002 intervention.  
 
Chapter Three seek to answer questions pertaining to the general trends of French motives for 
intervention in sub-Saharan. As such, I outline the quantitative framework that is developed for 
the thesis. I take into account various hypotheses and test, using the PRIO dataset, the relative 
strengths of these independent variables on the dependent variable (French intervention). Using a 
multivariate analysis, I am able to control for the individual effects of the variables making my 
results as robust as possible. With the findings from this statistical analysis I am able to develop 
a robust framework which can outline the strongest determinants of French intervention in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
In Chapter Four, I firstly seek to understand why France intervened in Côte d’Ivoire. Using the 
framework developed in Chapter Three, I further analyse the extent to which the 2002 
intervention is indicative of the general trends of intervention. Chapter Four thus demonstrates 
why France intervened in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 and the degree to which that intervention 




In Chapter Five, I present my conclusions for the thesis. By linking the literature review, the 
quantitative analysis and the case study of French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, I discuss the 
overall conclusions and implications of this thesis and its relevance to the existing state of 
knowledge regarding not only French military relations with sub-Saharan Africa, but Franco-





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of the current state of knowledge regarding why France 
intervened in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002. Since the 2002 intervention, a myriad of scholars have 
presented various arguments in attempts to explain why France intervened in Côte d’Ivoire. The 
arguments regarding French motives have by-and-large centred on either economic rationale for 
intervention, intervention as a form of power-politics and a projection of French power in Africa 
and internationally, and, to a lesser extent, intervention in Côte d’Ivoire is argued to have 
occurred on the basis of humanitarian concerns. While these different arguments each make 
important contributions, Regan notes how understanding why states choose to intervene in the 
affairs of other states is more often than not an elusive task.37  
 
In this chapter, the literature on France’s intervention in Cote d’Ivoire is complemented by the 
general literature on onsets of military intervention as well as the literature on French-African 
relations and French military engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. By doing so, this chapter 
highlights the broad sets of arguments regarding French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, arguments 
which serve as important sources for testable research hypotheses in the following chapter. The 
chapter is broken down into three sections. I first assess the ‘Gaullist’ arguments surrounding 
French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire as a means in which France promotes its international status 
(grandeur) and projects its power, not only in Africa but internationally. Secondly, I consider the 
neo-colonial school of thought, specifically focusing on the French economic motives for 
intervention. Lastly, I take into account humanitarian arguments for intervention and arguments 
pertaining to France’s objective of preventing bloodshed and ensuring stability. 
 
2.2 International grandeur and power projection 
As a point of departure, this literature review assesses arguments centred on realpolitik which 
contends that military interventions are foreign policy tools engineered towards securing 
                                               
37 Patrick Regan, Civil War and Foreign Powers: Outside Interventions in Intrastate Conflict,(University of 
Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2002): 4 
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interveners’ national interests, as well as maintaining power relative to other states.38 Indeed, 
states, it is argued, intervene when there are perceived threats to the interveners’ strategic, 
national and geopolitical interests.39 By this logic, scholars argue that France intervened in Côte 
d’Ivoire with the purpose of quelling perceived threats to its national interests. Indeed, French 
intervention in Côte d’Ivoire cannot be understood without taking into account France’s national 
interests and the important position of Côte d’Ivoire vis-à-vis its interests. To be sure, several 
authors have shown how France’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire is inseparable from the Gaullist 
underpinnings of French decision-makers. Charbonneau, for example, contends that France’s 
action in Côte d’Ivoire were little more than the latest in a series of French attempts to enhance 
its domination and influence, not only in Côte d’Ivoire but throughout sub-Saharan Africa.40 
Likewise, Banégas suggests that France’s military intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was but an 
attempt to increase its international relevant and status, while N’Diaye and Pascallon suggesting 
that France’s political elite, notably President Jacques Chirac, sought to reengage in African 
crises and by extension the Ivorian crisis, in a fashion consistent with the tradition of Gaullism.41 
In essence, these authors note how the French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was driven by its 
need to remain an influential and important actor in not only Africa, but internationally. 
This need to remain an influential and important actor is often argued to be rooted in France’s 
longstanding traditional of Gaullism. In fact, Chafer shows how France, dating back to De 
Gaulle’s presidency in the 1950s, has consistently sought international grandeur and the need to 
reassert itself as a global power, especially after World War Two and humiliating colonial 
defeats in Indochina and Algeria.42 Moreover, Renou contends that France found in Francophone 
Africa the means by which it could redevelop and reassert itself as a relevant and powerful actor 
38Joseph M Grieco, "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal 
institutionalism." International organisation 42.03 (1988): 1; James Scott,Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan 
Doctrine and American Foreign Policy,(Durham: Duke University Press, 1996); Michael G Findley and Tze Kwang 
Teo, "Rethinking Third‐Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor‐Centric Approach", Journal of Politics 68.4 
(2006) 
39James Scott, Deciding to Intervene 
40 Charbonneau,  France and the New Imperialism, 149 
41 Richard Banégas, Roland Marchal, and Julien Meimon,"La fin du pacte colonial? La politique africaine de la 
France sous J. Chirac et après", Politique africaine 105 (2007): 19’N'Diaye, Still Getting Away With it, 308; Pierre 
Pascallon,"Le reengagement de la France pour la Securité en Afrique", Geopolitique Africaine 14 (2004): 211-218 
42 Tony Chafer, "Hollande and Africa Policy", Modern & Contemporary France22.4 (2014): 514.  
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on the international stage.43 As such, Charbonneau and Renou assert that Francophone Africa, 
particularly France’s former colonies, was considered France’s pré carré, garde chasse or 
domaine reserve, providing France with a historical sphere of influence which strongly 
resembles the US’s Monroe doctrine.44 Complementing these arguments, Staniland notes that 
France’s sphere of influence in the post-independence epoch, as well as its need to project its 
power internationally is largely consistent with realist assumptions whereby France has sought to 
retain and enhance its major-power status.45 To be sure, Guillot explains that France is often 
deemed a middle-power, and, as such, has needed to intervene and engage in African conflicts 
and disputes to justify its importance in the world order, and, for example, to justify its position 
on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).46 The diminishing power of France and the 
wilting of the French Empire in the Post-World War Two era, as argued, has thus compelled 
France to find the means to remain relevant, important and influential in the international system. 
Francophone Africa, it seems, has proven to be the means through which France has attempted to 
do so.  
 
As such, throughout much of the post-colonial period, France has been argued to use 
Francophone Africa so as to ‘punch above’ its international weight and enhance its international 
relevance and prestige. As famously said by former Foreign Affairs Minister Louis de 
Guiringaud ‘Africa is the only continent where France is still able to change the course of 
history with only 500 men’.47 Similar sentiments have emanated from Former President Jacques 
Chirac: ‘Without Africa, France will slide down into the rank of a third [world] power’48 
and Former Foreign minister Jacques Godfrain: ‘a little country [France], with a small amount 
                                               
43 Renou, "A new French policy for Africa", 7 
44 Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism, 50; Renou, "A new French policy for Africa", 6 
The Monroe doctrine, as a concept, contends that Latin America would be under the exclusive influence and 
‘protection’ of the USA. Similarly, Francophone Africa would be the exclusive domain of France, and as such off 
limits to other external powers.  
45 Martin Staniland, "Francophone Africa: the enduring French connection", The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science (1987): 56 
46Philippe Guillot, "France, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention",International Peacekeeping 1.1 (1994): 5 
47Quoted in Jean-François Bayart, "France-Afrique: la fin du pacte colonial", Politique Africaine 39 (1990): 47; 
Vallin, "France as the Gendarme of Africa”, 82/83 
48 Quoted in Illisha,"Bleeding Africa: A Half Century of the Françafrique", Loon watch, March 25, 2014, accessed 
August 8, 2015. http://www.loonwatch.com/2014/03/bleeding-africa-a-half-century-of-the-francafrique/ 
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of strength, we [France] can move a planet because of our relations with 15 or 20 African 
countries’.49 
 
The arguments aforementioned can similarly be applied to the case-study of Côte d’Ivoire. 
France’s military intervention in 2002 has been argued to be the theatre in which Chirac and 
associates sought to reengage with African affairs, essentially enhancing its power position in its 
pré carré and on the international stage. Indeed, Charbonneau argues that French Africa policy, 
seen through the case of French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, centres on the same issues of 
influence, subordination and domination within its traditional sphere of influence.50 When such 
influence and domination come under threat, as in the case of communist expansion51 during the 
Cold War or Anglophone encroachment,52 France has historically intervened to re-establish itself 
as the most relevant, dominant and influential actor in the region. Similarly, Côte d’Ivoire has 
been perhaps France’s most successful former colony in sub-Saharan Africa and, as Moncrieff 
argues, ‘Côte d’Ivoire could be held by the French as an example of the success of their broader 
Africa policy.53 Any threat, it is argued, to Côte d’Ivoire and subsequently France’s success 
story, which serves to legitimise France’s role in Africa and international importance, would 
most likely be met by French military intervention. This logic is shared by Tillema who argues 
that military interventions are premised on realist ideas that states act according to their national 
interests in which powerful states like France have a greater array of capabilities and resources 
and are argued to intervene more frequently than minor states.54 As such, for some the French 
                                               
49Quoted in Thabo Mbeki,"What the World Got Wrong in Côte d’Ivoire: Why is the United Nations Entrenching 
Former Colonial Powers on our Continent? African can and should take the lead in resolving their own 
disputes",Foreign Policy, April 29, 2011, accessed July 15, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/29/what-the-
world-got-wrong-in-cote-divoire/ 
50Charbonneau, France and the New Imperalism, 149 
51 See: Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign intervention in Africa: from the Cold War to the War on Terror (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013): 182; Elizabeth Rechniewski, A Small War in Cameroon. Small Wars Journal 
52 See: Schraeder, "Cold War to Cold Peace”; Tony Chafer," The UK and France in West Africa: Towards 
Convergence?", African Security 6.3/4, (2013): 234/235; Asteris C Huliaras, "The ‘Anglo-Saxon Conspiracy": 
French perceptions of the Great Lakes crisis", The Journal of Modern African Studies 36.04 (1998): 593-609 
53 Richard Moncrieff, French Development Aid and the Reforms of 1998-2002,(PHD Thesis; University of 
Southampton, United kingdom, 2004):147 
54Herbert K Tillema, "Foreign overt military intervention in the nuclear age", Journal of Peace Research 26.2 
(1989): 186; Robert A Baumann and. Jeffrey J Pickering, "Military intervention and realpolitik", in Reconstructing 
Realpolitik, edited by Frank Wayman & Paul Diehl, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994): 223; Douglas 
Lemke, & Patrick Regan, Intervention as Influence in The scourge of war: New extensions on an old problem, edited 
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intervention in Côte d’Ivoire is another example of an intervention as but ‘another foreign policy 
tool used for pursuing national interests, such as extending power interests’.55 
 
2.3 France, the neo-colonial power 
Certainly, there are elements of truth in the notion that France’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire is 
but an extension of its need to project power both on the continent and international. Yet another 
set of literature, complementing the previous arguments, is centred on France’s imperialist 
interests in Côte d’Ivoire and its need to protect its more concreteinterests.56 In agreement, 
Lemke and Regan note how powerful states retain important strategic and economic interests in 
their former colonies and are thus more likely to intervene in order to protect such interests.57 
Yet, the idea that states intervene to protect their interests is certainly nothing new or surprisingin 
international relations scholarship.58 Regardless, various scholars have sought to analyse the 
myriad of French interests, not only in Cote d’Ivoire, but sub-Saharan Africaas a whole and have 
attempted to show how these interestshave resulted in French military action. 
 
The underpinning of such thinking is largely centred on France’s wide-ranging and well-
documented economic interests in Côte d’Ivoire, and indeed sub-Saharan Africa. Among such 
interests are the myriad of strategically important natural resources, notably uranium and oil, 
which France has historically depended on.59 The intervention in Gabon (1964) and Congo-
Brazzaville (1997) are perhaps the most clear-cut examples of French intervention to protect 
                                               
55Seung-Whan Choi, "What determines US humanitarian intervention?", Conflict Management and Peace 
Science 30.2 (2013): 122 
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2012) 
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access to natural resources.60 Related to resource extraction are France’s important trade ties with 
sub-Saharan Africa. Moncrieff, as well as Stojek and Chacha, make notable references to the 
importance of trade and the degree to which it determines French intervention.61 In such ways, 
France has been argued to mimic the general patterns of intervention based on economic interest. 
This is especially the case as various scholars have shown how strong economic interests,62 the 
presence of natural resources,63 the presence of lootable resources,64 strong bilateral trade 
relations,65 and strong regional economic ties66 increase the likelihood of military 
intervention.Scholars have therefore shown how French economic interests are largely consistent 
with the general literature on onsets of military intervention and are important determinants of 
French interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
These patterns of intervention due to economic factors have certainlybeen incorporated into 
analyses regarding French intervention in Cote d’Ivoire.67 Indeed, this line of thought has been 
well-supported by the work of Araoye who argues that France’sreal motive for intervention was 
to protect its concrete imperialist interests in Cote d’Ivoire. Of note, he suggests that the Gbagbo 
regime was perceived as a long-term threat to French economic interests, providing sufficient 
motive for intervention, and perhaps the overthrow of Gbagbo.68 In similar ways, those within 
                                               
60 In both cases, there is strong evidence to suggest that France’s intervention was influenced by its need to protect it 
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the Gbagbo establishment repetitively banged the neo-colonial drum, criticising France for 
pursuing an imperialist agenda in Cote d’Ivoire. Of note, Mamadou Koulibaly and Charles Blé 
Goudé, two leading figures in Gbagbo’s ‘young patriot’ movement, embraced a neo-colonial 
discourse, rallying large-scale support in Cote d’Ivoireagainst French military intervention.69 
 
As such, Piccolino argues that a ‘standard narrative has developed, where France’s military 
intervention was presented as demonstrating that France had pursued a clear and coherent 
strategy of discarding Gbagbo’.70 Banégas supports such arguments as he states that this rhetoric 
was the preferred vehicle in which the Ivorian government sought to win domestic and 
international support and legitimacy.71 This rhetoric so entrenched, many described the Ivorian 
civil war as the ‘second war of independence’, a term in reference to the perception that France’s 
military action was set on destabilising, if not removing, the Gbagbo regime.72 Similar 
sentiments echoing neo-colonialism and imperialism have emanated from outside Cote d’Ivoire, 
notably arguments from former South African President Thabo Mbeki.73 Certainly, there is 
historical precedent, specifically with regards to French military action in sub-Saharan Africa, to 
suggest that France is able and willing to depose African elites, like Gbagbo, who threaten 
French interest, economic or otherwise.74 Conversely, France has time and again intervened to 
protect and reinstate its African allies who have traditionally adhered to and protected French 
interests.75 Yet, the fact that France chose not to, initially, take sides in the intervention suggests 
other, perhaps more important, motives for intervention. In other words, had France’s true 
motives for intervention been the clear-cut removal of Gbagbo, one would have arguably 
expected France’s to simply use its superior military to oust the substantially weaker Gbagbo. 
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However, this was not what actually happened in 2002, casting doubt on whether this was the 
true motive of the French military intervention. 
 
Moreover, as argued by Bovcon, the neo-colonial argument regarding French intervention in 
Cote d’Ivoire was by-and-large superficial as it was incorporated into government rhetoric, 
aimed at increasing support amongst the Ivorian citizenry, notably the ‘young patriots’.76 
Similarly, Charbonneau notes how, despite the neo-colonial rhetoric emanating from the Ivorian 
government, Gbagbo entrusted large parts of the Ivorian economy in the hands of the French, 
perhaps indicating the lack of truly substantive claims regarding French economic motives for 
intervention.77 He further suggests that vital Ivorian resources, notably cocoa and the growing oil 
industry were in fact not in French hands, further illustrating the superficiality of the rhetoric 
surrounding the neo-colonial argument.78 As such, while there have been strong arguments 
regarding French economic interests in Cote d’Ivoire, there is certainly no consensus amongst 
scholars as to whether this is the only, or most important, determinant of intervention in Cote 
d’Ivoire. 
 
2.4 Humanitarian arguments 
Analyses of French motives for intervention have hitherto focused on realist and economic 
determinants for intervention. While certainly containing elements of truth, there is by no means 
consensus as to why France intervened in Cote d’Ivoire. Indeed, arguments have been made 
suggesting that France’s intervention resulted from the increasingly deteriorating humanitarian 
situation in Cote d’Ivoire. As such, Opération Licorne was launched so as to bring some 
semblance of stability to Cote d’Ivoire, stability that was needed to find political solutions to the 
conflict.  
 
At the forefront of such explanations were leading French political figures, notably President 
Jacques Chirac and Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin. Indeed, French officials 
repetitively reasserted how the intervention was motivated by the desire to establish peace and 
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stability, so as to find a diplomatic solution to the crises. For example, de Villepin stated that the 
role of the French military in the Ivorian crisis was to stabilise the situation and that one of the 
fundamental objectives of Operation Licorne was without doubt to prevent a bloodbath akin to 
that of Rwanda in 1994.79 The importance of the Rwandan experience to French policymakers, it 
is argued, cannot be divorced from understanding the intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. For example, 
Smith notes how French officials were able to draw parallels between situations in Rwanda and 
Cote d’Ivoire, and as such, sought to prevent a human catastrophe resembling the Rwandan 
crisis.80 The memory and shame of France’s infamous role in the Rwandan crisis, which resulted 
in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans, compelled French leaders to ensure a 
similar catastrophe did not occur in Cote d’Ivoire.81 Supporting such notions of humanitarian 
motives for intervention, Charbonneau notes how the intervention could have come about as a 
result of French desires to prevent a North-South civil war, with the aim of limiting the 
bloodshed.82 Similarly, the fact that France initially intervened so as to protect thousands of 
French citizens, living in Cote d’Ivoire, further supports the purely humanitarian motives for 
French intervention.83 
 
Indeed, the idea that states intervene for humanitarian reasons has gained increasing currency 
and popularity in recent time.84 The rising popularity and legitimacy of the principles of Right to 
Protect (R2P) and humanitarian intervention certainly had an effect on intervening states. 
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Finnemore, for example, argues that military interventions have become increasingly more 
humanitarian in the post-Cold War era while Bellamy & Wheeler consider the 1990s to be the 
golden age of humanitarian activism and intervention.85 The fact that France did establish a 
buffer zone between the belligerents, did evacuate and protect thousands of French nationals, and 
took a leading role in the peace negotiations suggests that there were indeed some humanitarian 
underpinnings to its motivations for intervention. Yet, as has been the case throughout much of 
recent history, and as argued by Dowty and Loescher, interventions, justified on humanitarian 
grounds, are often phrases in such ways so to disguise true motives for interventions, motives of 
a more cynical nature.86 In fact, Charbonneau goes as far as to argue that the buffer zone, 
established by the French, served only to legitimise the rebels as important political forces with 
recognised political grievances.87 Similarly, Bovcon states that the protection of foreign national 
essentially legitimised French intervention, allowing France to immerse itself in the Ivorian 
crisis.88 As such, while some suggest that France intervened for humanitarian reasons there are 
certainly arguments to suggest otherwise. In sum, the literature provides important humanitarian 
arguments for French intervention in Cote d’Ivoire. While one cannot deny that these motives 
were important in spurring French intervention, they are certainly not the only motives, or the 
most important.  
 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has sought to outline the current state of knowledge regarding why France 
intervened in 2002 in Cote d’Ivoire. In analysingthree broad schools of thought, this chapter has 
highlighted the corearguments regarding French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire and has 
additionally set the scene for the subsequent chapter. 
 
Of note, I have consideredarguments centred on realist notions of France’s military intervention 
in Cote d’Ivoire. Specifically, it was shown how France’s need to remain relevant, not only in 
Africa but internationally, as well as the Gaullist underpinnings of the French political elites, led 
                                               
85Finnemore, "Constructing norms of humanitarian intervention.": 1; Bellemy and Wheeler, "Humanitarian 
intervention in world politics." 
86Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher, "Refugee flows as grounds for international action", International Security 21.1 
(1996): 71 
87Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism, 163; Bruno Charbonneau, "War and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire: 
Violence, Agency, and the Local/International Line", International Peacekeeping 19.4 (2012): 508-524 
88Bovcon, "France’s Conflict Resolution", 6 
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to France intervening in Cote d’Ivoire. The second set of arguments contends that France’s 
intervention can be explained by its imperial interests, notably economic interests, in Cote 
d’Ivoire. Any perceived threat to these interests, it is argued, will compel France to intervene to 
ensure such valuable interests are maintained. Lastly, a set of humanitarian explanations to 
French intervention in Cote d’Ivoirewere discussed. Indeed, there are arguments to suggest that 
France intervened to avoid a bloodbath and ensure stability in Cote d’Ivoire. Moreover, the large 
presence of French nationals in Cote d’Ivoire resulted in France’s need to protect these nationals, 
further suggesting humanitarian motives for intervention. 
 
All three sets of arguments certainly have important explanatory power regarding why France 
intervened in Côte d’Ivoire. That is to say, in this chapter I have evaluated the relevant literature 
of why France intervenes, not only in Cote d’Ivoire but in sub-Saharan Africa. These arguments 
aforementioned, in effect, provide the motivations and justifications for hypotheses in the 
following chapter. Using this robust set of literature, I proceed to quantitatively test these 
arguments in order to develop an analytical framework of a typical French intervention in sub-
Saharan Africa. Adding to the literature, the remainder this thesis analyses the general trends of 
French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, and uses those trends to assess the extent to which 
French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire represents significantly different motives for intervention, or 







Chapter 3: Quantitative analysis of French interventions 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The examination of the literature in the preceding chapter has highlighted some important 
arguments regarding French intervention not only in Cote d’Ivoire but also in sub-Saharan 
Africa. In this chapter, I am seeking to answer the supplementary research question: What are 
the general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan? In order to answer this question 
this chapter develops an analytical framework which outlines the general trends of French 
motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In other words, this chapter investigates what 
factors are important determinants of French interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. By answering 
this question, we develop an analytical framework which allows us to understand the extent to 
which the intervention in Côte d’Ivoire complements or refutes the general trends of French 
intervention. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: Firstly, through a discussion of the datasetI describe the 
research design of this chapter. Secondly, I discuss the core concepts used to test the variables, as 
well as how these concepts are operationalised (measured). Thirdly, I conduct quantitative 
analysis, primarily using the logistic regression model as well as some initial bivariate analyses 
to test the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable. In sum, I find evidence 
suggesting that France is more likely to intervene in African states with which it has strong 
colonial ties, strong cultural and linguistic ties, more entrenched economic interests (notably 
trade). Moreover, I find that the typical French intervention in Africa generally occurs in low 
intensity (deaths) crises. As such, this chapter is able to develop a robust analytical framework 
which can be applied the French intervention in Cote d’Ivoire.  
 
3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 PRIO dataset 
For this analysis, I have selected the most current version of the UCDP/PRIO, which is a 
continuation of initial data collected by Gleditsch et al.89 Like other well-known conflict 
datasets, the PRIO dataset focuses specifically on tracking armed conflict around the world. 
                                               
89Nils PetterGleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, "Armed 
conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset",Journal of peace research 39.5 (2002): 615-637. 
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However, the PRIO dataset differs from other major conflict datasets as it has a significantly 
lower threshold of what constitutes conflict (25 battle-related deaths per year in which at least 
one actor is the recognised government).90 Other major datasets, notable the Correlates of War 
(COW) dataset, have thresholds which are far higher and thus do not capture as many instances 
of conflicts and crises of a smaller, less intense nature.91  The low threshold found in this dataset 
allows us to investigate more instances of French interventions in these conflicts.  
 
Additionally, France has intervened in situation which cannot always be classified as conflicts 
and as such are not captured by high threshold datasets like that COW dataset. While this may 
certainly be the case in the PRIO dataset, there is greater chance that such intervention in non-
conflict situations will be captured due to the far lower threshold of conflict.92 
 
The PRIO dataset, like other major datasets, tracks conflicts on a yearly basis. As such, the unit 
of analysis in the dataset is the conflict year in African states.93 To illustrate, the liberation war in 
Guinea-Bissau lasted from 1963 to 1974. Therefore, the PRIO dataset notes every year of the 
conflict and considers it a separate event thus making 12 cases of conflict in the dataset. We 
obtained data on French interventions from the International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset 
which tracks intervention between 1960 and 2005 and code such interventions into the PRIO 
dataset.94The time frame for the analysis is thus from 1960 to 2005, and while I would like to 





                                               
90LottaHarbom, S. Havard, and M. N. Havard, "UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset codebook", Codebook.Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (2009). 
91 The COW dataset has a threshold of a 1000 battle deaths per year between combatants.   
92 With that being said, some French interventions found within the literature have not been captured by the PRIO 
dataset, notably in instances where there were fewer than 25 deaths. The author is thus well aware of this limitation, 
but as will be seen there were enough cases of French intervention to run statistical analyses, regardless of 
interventions that did not meet the dataset’s threshold. 
93Harbom et al, "UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset codebook", 3 
94 The IMI dataset tracks all interventions in Africa, regardless of whether the intervention occurred during a conflict 
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Table 2: PRIO Dataset - French interventions in Africa 
3.2.2 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable 
in this analysis is 
whether France 
intervened in sub-
Saharan Africa or not. I 
thus measure French 
intervention using a 
binary code to indicate 0 
for a French intervention 
and 1 for no intervention. I obtained the instances of French intervention from the IMI dataset, 
which tracks all interventions in sub-Saharan Africa according to the definition developed by 
Pearson and Baumann: ‘the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling 
etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute’.95 From this 
definition, table 2 shows the total number of cases for the PRIO analysis; France has intervened 
in 47 of the 469 conflict years in sub-Saharan Africa, roughly 10% of the conflict years in the 
dataset.96 
 
3.2.3 Independent variables 
Drawn largely from the literature, the independent variables are discussed in which my 
hypothesised relationships are outlined. For some of the hypotheses in the literature, however, 
valid and reliable quantitative measures could not be found. For example, I  was unable to find a 
suitable measure for international ‘prestige’ and grandeur which we can use to quantitatively test 
as to whether states intervene in situations to enhance their international images is beyond the 
knowledge of the author. As such, I leave such hypotheses to the qualitative sections of this 




                                               
95Pearson and Baumann, International Military Intervention 1946-1988, 1 
96See Appendix 2 for a full list of French interventions within the PRIO dataset 
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3.2.3.1Historic determinants of interventions 
More so than any other ex-coloniser, France has been argued to intervene in its former colonies 
for a number of reasons.97 Specifically, France has been argued to intervene to maintain its 
influence and domination in Francophone Africa, specifically with its former colonies often 
proving to be the theatres of such interventions. Additionally, as has been argued, interveners 
which have strong colonial ties to the target, in the form of political, military and cultural ties are 
more likely to be involved in the affairs of the target, and are this more likely to intervene.98 As 
such, we consider this hypothesis in the quantitative analysis. 
 
H1: France is more likely to intervene in its former colonies than states which have no 
historical relationship 
 
While certainly a key premise in the literature, many argue that France has sought to expand its 
influence beyond its former colonies. This is especially the case with regards to African states 
that have strong cultural and/or linguistic connections to France, notably, former Belgian 
colonies which have long been of interest to France in the post-colonial period. To be sure, 
France has long been influential in the affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formally 
Zaire), specifically France supported President Mobuto with the financial and military aid. 
Similarly, France has played an integral role in Rwandan Affairs supporting the Habyarimana 
regime with large amounts of military and financial aid and intervened to assist Rwanda military 
forces quell external threats, notably from the RPF. France has attempted to include such states 
in its sphere of influence as thus is more likely to intervene in states which have a linguistic 
and/or cultural connection with the French metropole. 
 
H2: France is more likely to intervene in states which have stronger cultural and linguisticties 
(francophone community) 
 
                                               
97 See Table 1; Amit Singh,"France: Why Intervene in Mali and Central African Republic?", The Guardian, 
February 05, 2013, accessed July 08, 2015.  
98Renée Edwards, Audrey Mattoon, and Andrew Appleton, "Successful intervention in civil wars: Former colonial 
status as a missing variable", 2012, accessed April 15 2015. 
http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/edwardsmattoonappleton.pdf: 6; Charbonneau,France and the New 
Imperialism, 149; Lemke and Regan, Intervention as Influence,162. 
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The measure for both these independent variables is dichotomous. As such, conflict that occurred 
in former French colonies is coded as 0 and those conflicts in outside of France’s colonial sphere 
are coded as 1. This variable is taken from Hensel’s Colonial History dataset and tests as to 
whether the conflict country was a former colony of France.99  Similarly, to create the variable 
for the Francophone connection, those African countries that speak French, including France’s 
ex-colonies, are coded as 0 and all other African states that experienced conflict are coded as 
1.100 
 
3.2.3.1 Economic determinants of interventions 
Trade relations have consistently been posited to determine a state’s likelihood of military 
intervention. France, in this regard, has been no exception as accusations have long suggested 
that France intervenes to protect its economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically in 
former colonies with which it shares stronger trade relations. In such ways, France is more likely 
to intervene in states with which it shares strong economic relations, but even more likely to 
intervene in former colonies with which it shares stronger economic relations. To test French 
economic interests, I use French bilateral trade relations with sub-Saharan African states. 
 
H3: France is more likely to intervene in African states, and specifically, former African 
colonies with which it has higher levels of bilateral trade. 
 
To test the effects of trade relations on France’s likelihood to intervene, I use bilateral trade data 
collected by Barbiera & Keshk in their COW bilateral trade dataset.101 This dataset tracks dyadic 
trade relations from 1870–2009. For the majority of sub-Saharan African states, the dataset starts 
from the 1960s, although this largely depends on the timing of independence of relevant African 
states. Specifically, this dataset collects data on exports and imports from country A to country 
B, and thus, in order to calculate the total trading relations between the intervener and the target I 
                                               
99Paul R.Hensel, "ICOW Colonial History Data Set, version 1.0", 2014, accessed June 16 
2015.http://www.paulhensel.org/icowcol.html 
100 Because these two variables are very similar in nature, we will test them separately from each other in two 
separate models. They have a correlation coefficient of .829, a very high value suggesting that they are measuring 
something very similar i.e. multicollinearity, yet conceptually they are measuring two slightly different concepts 
101 For access to their dataset see: Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, "Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set 
Codebook, Version 3.0" (2012): For access to their methodology and codebooks see: Katherine Barbieri, Omar MG 
Keshk, and Brian M. Pollins, "Trading data evaluating our assumptions and coding rules", Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 26.5 (2009): 471-491. 
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combine exports and imports to create a trade variable (total dyadic trade). Moreover, to make 
the results as reliable as possible I lag trade by 1 year. As noted by Stojek & Chacha, ‘lagging 
trade values allow us to avoid picking up on trade due to the act of intervention itself such as 
arms and provisions exported by the intervener to the conflict state, which could significantly 
bias the results’.102 
 
A myriad of scholars have further made the argument that the natural resources of African states 
have historically been attractive to the French. A plethora of research has noted how France has 
intervened to protect its economic interests and strategic natural resources. As such, I contend 
that there is a relationship between the level of natural resources and the likelihood of French 
intervention. 
 
H4: France is more likely to intervene in African states which produce higher amounts of 
natural resources. 
 
To measure the level of natural resource production, I use World Bank data which deduces the 
percentage of a state’s GDP that is derived from natural resources. In this instance, natural 
resources are measured as the ‘total sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, minerals rents 
and forest rents.’103 To create a total amount of rents from natural resources, in US Dollars, I 
multiple the percentages by 100 to obtain an actual amount of official rents extracted.  
 
3.2.3.3 Humanitarian determinants 
Altruistic arguments have stipulated that France intervenes in situations and conflicts where there 
have been high civilian casualties and suffering. Certainly, there is great debate about the merits 
of such arguments, not only for France but for a plethora of intervening states. Of note, the 
increasing popularity and importance of R2P as a fundamental principle of military 
interventions, has necessitated that capable states that are able should intervene in situations and 
conflicts where human lives are in danger, and in which the state responsible for those lives are 
unable or unwilling to so do. Certainly, there have been French interventions which have 
                                               
102Stojek and Chacha,"Adding trade",233 




contained, at least partly, humanitarian underpinning while in other instances an altruistic 
rationale for intervention has been little more than a smoke-screen to disguise the true motives 
for said intervention. With regards to late latter, France’s important role and intervention in the 
Rwandan genocide is perhaps the most pronounced example while recent examples of French 
intervention in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) arguably have strong undertones of 
humanitarianism. Regardless, I consider such arguments in the analyses and I test the degree to 
which France’s motives for military intervention are centred on altruism, humanitarianism and 
the principles of R2P. 
 
H5: France is more likely to intervene in conflicts which have a higher loss of human life. 
 
Finding a suitable measure for the loss of life during conflict (intensity) has proven to be 
difficult. This has primarily been the result of the unreliability of casualty figures obtained 
during the chaos of conflict. However, the PRIO dataset does have a proxy which determines 
whether the conflict produced total deaths below 1000 persons or over 1000 persons. As such, it 
codes total deaths under 1000 persons as 1 and over 1000 persons as 0.  
 
Moreover, the literature suggests that the forced displacement of peoples due to conflict and 
instability has often prompted military intervention. While evidence of this in the case of France 
is relatively scant, I include the effects of the number of refugee and internally displaced persons 
on France’s likelihood to intervene.  
 
H6: France is more likely to intervene in conflicts which produce higher numbers of forcibly 
displaced persons.  
 
As was the case with the intensity of a conflict, finding reliable data on peoples that were 
forcibly displaced due to conflict has proven challenging. Yet, the U.S Committee for Refugees 
and Immigrants (USCRI) has collected a relatively robust amount of data regarding the amounts 
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of persons who were forcibly displaced during conflict.104 This variable has been lagged by 1 
year for reasons previously discussed. 
 
3.2.3.4 Control Variables 
The hypotheses and variables under discussion form the core of the analysis in this chapter. 
However, to be as robust as possible, we include some important control variables which 
potentially impact France’s willingness to intervene. Of note, I consider the regime type of sub-
Saharan states to be an important proxy variable. This may be the case as interveners may be 
more likely to deploy troops in countries which have democratically elected governments, but 
which are under threat from a hostile force. As such, we measure democracy using the Polity IV 
democracy index which tracks democratic regimes back to the 19th century.105 We chose to use 
Polity above other popular indexes; notably the Freedom House as it tracks democracies longer 
than most other datasets.106 Operationally, the Polity IV index uses an index of -10 to +10, 
whereby -10 indicates a full autocracy while +10 indicated a full democratic state. 
 
Besides the democratic inclinations of the target, we also control for the economic development 
of the target country. We do so as the more wealthy a state the more likely that state will have 
stronger purchasing power, and thus trading power, on the international stage. Thus the level of 
wealth in a country directly affects international trade relations and trading power of the target. 
To test this variable, we use World Bank data which captures the GDP per capita income of each 
African state found in the PRIO dataset.107  Lastly, some scholars, notable Regan, suggest that 
the Cold War had important bearings on state’s willingness to intervene.108 As such, we control 




                                               
104For access to the dataset see: Centre for Systematic Peace,INSCR Data Page, 2014, accessed June 21 
2015.http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html, 
105Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, "Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-
2002." (2002), accessed: June 30 2015. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2013.pdf 
106 Freedom House data, for example, only goes back to 1974. 
107World Bank, GDP per Capita (current US$), 2015b, accessed June 26, 2015b. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD, 




Before we proceed with the analysis, several important limitations need to be acknowledged. 
Firstly, by adding a relatively large quantity of independent variables into the model, we find that 
the number of missing cases increases. This is largely a result of missing data for the years and 
countries under analysis, especially in sub-Saharan Africa where reliable data dating back to the 
1960s often doesn’t exist. As such, there is a diminished sample size in the statistical models.109 
 
Moreover, for several of the variables, there is a concern as to whether the measure is valid and 
reliable. Certainly, this is a concern whenever one attempts to measure concepts, yet I am well 
aware of such problems of validity and reliability and have chosen the most suitable and accurate 
measures available to test the hypothesised relationships. By analysing datasets found in peer-
reviewed journals and articles I have attempted to select the most reliable and valid datasets 
available.    
 
As has been aforementioned, the PRIO dataset is unable to capture all French interventions 
between 1960 and 2005. In fact, 13 interventions captured in the IMI were excluded from the 
PRIO dataset as a result of those interventions occurring in a non-conflict scenario, thus in 
situations which don’t meet the PRIO threshold. Ideally, I would like to include all French 
interventions so as to make the results as robust as possible. Despite such a set-back I am still 
able to analyse the remaining interventions (32 cases of French intervention).  
 
Lastly, drawing on earlier observations, some of the hypotheses mentioned in the literature 
review are unsuitable for quantitative analysis. Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identity 
a quantitative measure for French pursuits of grandeur or prestige. Additionally, it would prove 
difficult to quantitatively test levels of Anglophone encroachment in Francophone spaces. 
Despite such concerns, I feel that there is enough evidence and quantifiable data to run statistical 
tests, producing results that can assist in answering the research questions. In sum, there are 
several limitations to the quantitative analysis in this thesis. However, I feel that no single 
                                               
109To reduce the number of missing cases, for those variables where there were lagged years but there was no data 
for the year before, I used data for the current year. This was true for data for: Trade, Population, GDP, natural 
resources and refugees.  
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In order to test the individual effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable while 
simultaneously controlling for all other independent variables, we use regression models in this 
section. The dependent variable in this analysis is dichotomous as it only has two categories.110 
As a result, we are compelled to use a binominal logistic regression, a statistical tool that is 
similar to multilinear regression but which provides odd ratios for the independent variables. We 
analyse the results of the PRIO dataset which compares French interventions in African conflicts 
to conflicts where French intervention was absent. For the PRIO dataset, we implement two 
models; the first model accounts for the colonial heritage of the African state, while model 2 
assesses if the African state was part of the larger Francophone community 
 
From table 3, we can see that the two models are statistically significant. To be sure, model 1 is 
overall significant (p≤.01) with a Chi-Square of 61.129. Similarly, model 2 is overall significant 
(p≤.01, Chi-Squared: 75.334). These overall significances show that overall the models do a 
good job in explaining why France intervenes in sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, the explained 
variance of the dependent variables by the independent variables can be found using the 
Nagelkerke R2.111For Model 1 the Nagelkerke R2 is 38.3% while the second model’s R2 is 
45.5%. Although these R2 are relatively large, suggesting the independent variables are strong 
predictors of the dependent variable, the fact that they are pseudo- R2 casts doubt over the 




                                               
110 (0 = French intervention, 1 = No French intervention) 
111 The Nagelkerke R2is a pseudo R2 and as such is not as accurate as R2found in multilinear regression models. 
112 For a more accurate measure of the model we use classification ratios: Model 1: The overall observed 
classification ratio was 90.9 % and the predicted classification ratio was 97.844%. Model 2: The overall observed 
classification ratio was 92.5 % and the predicted classification ratio was 97.844%.  For both models, the observed 
classification ratio was not larger than the threshold ratio (predicted) which, in effect, casts doubt on the reliability 
of this model. However, the overall significance of the model is ≤.01 and thus, while there are some issues with the 
model, we can still consider it to be important and reliable. 
41 
 
Table 3: French Intervention: Logistics Regression Model (PRIO Dataset) 
 Model 1: Former Colony Model 2: Francophone Country 
 Beta Odds Ratio Beta Odds Ratio 
Intercept 91.203 - 81.605 - 
Trade113 
.017* 1.017 .022** 1.022 
Natural Resources114 





- - 3.323** 27.743 
Refugees 
-.006 .994 -.001 .999 
Intensity 
1.920** 6.822 1.989** 7.308 
Target Democracy -.106 .899 -.052 949 
Target GDP Per Capita .034* 1.034 .042** 1.043 
Cold War 
-.256 .774 .595 1.814 
Year of Conflict -.048 .953 -.044 .957 
Dependent variable – reference category: 0 (no intervention) 
Model 1: N = 274, Nagelkerke R2 = 38.3%, Cox & Snell = 20.2% p ≤ .01, Chi-Square - 61.863 
Model 2: N = 274, Nagelkerke R2= 45.5%, Cox & Snell 24% p ≤ .01, Chi-Squared – 75.268 
*p≤.05, **p≤.01 
 
To test the proposed hypothesis, I analyse the individual effects of the independent variables. 
Table 3 presents the individual effects of the independent variables. Firstly, of the economic 
                                               
1131 unit of trade has been coded as $10 Million 
1141 unit of natural resources has been coded as $10 Million 
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determinants of French interventions, the trade relations variable is the strongest predictor of 
French intervention. The dyadic trade relationship between France and African states is both 
positive and significant in both models (Model 1: p≤.01, Beta = .025 and Model 2: p≤.01, Beta = 
.022). As such, higher levels of dyadic trade relations are more likely to attract French 
intervention. These results thus support the initial hypothesis that France is more likely to 
intervene in African states which have higher levels of bilateral trade. Furthermore, the 
exponential B provides information in the form of the odds ratio for the independent variables. 
As such, the statistics suggest that for every unit increase in trade, France is 1.7%, in model 1, 
and 2.2%, in model 2, more likely to intervene than not intervening. 
 
Moreover, both the historical/colonial and linguistic/cultural hypotheses are supported by the 
results. To be sure, table 3 shows that France is 7.8 times more likely to intervene, as opposed to 
not intervening, in its former colonies, than in other African states with no colonial ties (p≤.01, 
Beta: 2.067). Similarly, the results support the hypothesis that France intervenes in African states 
which have a cultural connection (same language). As such, France is 27.74 times more likely to 
intervene in African states which belong to the Francophonie community, as opposed to non-
member African countries (p≤.01, Beta: 3.323). These two variables, relatively to the others, are 
very strong predictors of French interventions.  
 
With regards to the humanitarian motives for intervention, there is some evidence to suggest a 
relationship between the intensity of the conflict and the likelihood of French intervention. The 
results suggest that France intervenes in low-intensity conflicts; specifically, France is between 
6.8 - 7.3 times more likely to intervene, as opposed to not intervening, in conflicts producing a 
lower death toll (fewer than 1000 deaths), than in conflicts which have a higher death toll (over 
1000 deaths).  These results, while significant, contradict the earlier-stated hypothesis about 
France’s willingness to intervene in conflicts with increased intensity (Model 1: p≤.01, Beta: 
1.920; Model 2: p≤.01, Beta: 1.989). It thus appears that France often intervenes in low-intensity 
conflicts, where casualties are relatively low. 
 
Of the control variables that were included in the models, only the GDP per capita of the target 
was significant (Model 1: p≤.05, Beta: .034; Model 2: p≤.01, Beta: .042). Thus, according to the 
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data, France is more likely to intervene, as opposed to not intervene, in African countries which 
are wealthier. Specifically, when analysing the odds ratio, France is 4.1% (Model 1) and 4.9% 
(Model 2) more likely to intervene in African states for every unit increase of GDP per capita.115 
It also appears that the regime type has no bearing on whether France intervenes or not. 
Similarly, regardless of whether during the Cold War or after, France has intervened regardless. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to answer the research question: What are the general trends of 
French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan? Incorporating hypotheses derived from the 
literature in Chapter Two, I developed an analytical framework which outlines the general trends 
of French motives for intervention. The quantitative analysis thus provides some important 
findings as several hypotheses were supported and some rejected; a summary of the results can 
be seen in Table 4.  
Table 4: Summarised table of results: PRIO Dataset 
Variables Hypothesis? PRIO dataset 
Trade (H1) Accepted More trade – French intervention more 
likely 
Resources (H2) Rejected (not much 
evidence available) 
More resources – Less likely of 
intervention 
Intensity (H3) Rejected Lower Intensity – intervention more 
likely 
Refugee (H4) Rejected N/S 
Colonial History 
(H5) 
Accepted Former French Colony – French 
intervention more likely 
Francophone 
Community (H6) 
Accepted Francophone Country – French 
intervention more likely 
GDP Per Capita 
(Control) 
N/A Higher the GDP per capita – French 
intervention more likely 
Democracy (Control) N/A N/S 
                                               
1151 unit of GDP per capita has been coded as $100  
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Cold War (Control) N/A N/S 
Year (Control) N/A N/S 
N/S– No Significance, N/A – Not applicable 
 
To begin, we find little evidence for the hypothesis that France is more likely to intervene in 
African states with higher levels of natural resources. As such, the analysis does not find 
evidence to support the arguments postulated by a myriad of French intervention scholars.116 
Similarly, we find little support that France intervenes in response to growing numbers of 
refugees. In the literature there were relatively weak arguments supported France’s humanitarian 
motives for intervention. The lack of support of the refugee hypothesis supports such claims that 
altruism is limited in explaining French intervention. As such, the arguments of Blechman, 
Bellemy and Wheeler, Bellemy and Williams and Kohut and Toth are not supported by the 
findings in this analysis.117 With that being said, the results do suggest that there is a connection 
between French interventions and the intensity of the conflict. However, this connection appears 
contradictory to the predicted hypothesis. In fact, France appears more likely to intervene in low-
intensity conflict as opposed to high-intensity conflicts. 
 
Among the economic variables, there is evidence to suggest that trade is a significant predictor of 
French military interventions. As such, the hypothesis is supported by the data and can posit that 
France is more likely to intervene in states with higher levels of bilateral trade.In this way, the 
findings support the arguments of Moncrieff and Stojek and Chacha, who have suggested that 
trade relations are vitally important to French-Africa relations, and when those relations are 
threatened, France is more likely to intervene.118 As such, the findings suggest that France’s 
economic interests are important determinants of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Furthermore, the strongest predictors are those variables which centre on the colonial, historical 
and cultural connections between the intervener and the target. The results show that France is 
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significantly more likely to intervene in situations and conflicts in its former colonies. Similarly, 
France has expanded its sphere of influence as it appears to intervene more in Francophone 
African countries, regardless of colonial history. The significance of these variables suggests that 
scholars such as Charbonneau, Renou, Lemke and Regan were correct in their analyses.119 
Specifically, the findings suggest that France is more likely to intervene in its traditional sphere 
of influence or pré carré, where it has traditionally exerted dominance and influence, and with 
which it has enhanced its international power and relevance. As such, the findings support the 
realist arguments for military intervention outlined in Chapter Two.  
 
The findings from this chapter highlight some important trends regarding French motives for 
intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In sum, a typical Frenchintervention in sub-Saharan Africa 
takes place either in a former French colony, with which it shares close historical ties with, or in 
a Francophone country, which it shares linguistic and cultural ties with. Moreover, France is in 
general more likely to intervene in either a former colony or Francophone countries with which it 
shares strong bilateral trade relations,and by extension economic relations. Lastly, France tends 
to intervene in low-intensity situations and crises, in which the death toll is relatively small 
compared to other conflicts. As such, the findings tend to support the realist and economic 
arguments for intervention while little support exists suggesting humanitarian motives for French 
intervention.  
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Chapter 4: French Intervention in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In Chapter Three, I developed a framework which highlighted the general trends of French 
motives of interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. In this chapter, I incorporate this framework into 
the analysis of French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. In so doing, I engage with the research 
question: Why did France intervene in 2002 in Côte d’Ivoire?Moreover, by analysing 
France’s intervention, in light of the analytical framework, I am able to answer the question: To 
what extent does France’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire differ with the general trends of 
French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa? This chapter is structured as followed: Firstly, I 
analyse the variables of colonial history and economic interests, as determinant of general French 
intervention, with regards to Franco-Ivorian relations, and the consequent intervention in 2002. 
Secondly, I assess the degree to which humanitarian factors, notably the intensity of the crisis 
outlined in Chapter Three, affected the French intervention. Finally, I review political events and 
relationship in France and Côte d’Ivoire, showing how they influenced French intervention in 
2002. 
 
In assessing the extent to which French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire differs with or resembles 
the general trends of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, my analysis suggests that there 
are strong similarities. Indeed, my findings suggest that France’s close colonial ties with Côte 
d’Ivoire have produced strong and intertwined relations and interests notably: historic ties, 
personal relationships, military connections and cultural (émigré) connections. I further find that 
France’s economic ties with Côte d’Ivoire, through bilateral trade, investment, French aid and 
France’s regional economic interests, are equally, if not more, powerful. At the same time, I find 
limited evidence to suggest natural resources as a motivation for intervention had any effect on 
French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, further showing the resemblance between the general 
motives for intervention and the motives in Côte d’Ivoire. Moreover I find that the rapid 
deployment of French troops, before the crisis became increasingly violent, is largely in line with 
the intensity findings in Chapter Three, thus demonstrating further the resemblance of the Ivorian 
intervention to general French interventions. These factors thus illustrate the general trends of 
French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa and thus I conclude that the 2002 intervention in Côte 
d’Ivoireislargely indicative of France’s general motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, 
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as outlined in Chapter Three. Moreover, I find a series of events and factors surrounding the 
intervention which contributed to France’s intervention. Of note, the perceived deterioration of 
the situation in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, France’s need to protect its citizens, and the political 
dynamics in both France and Côte d’Ivoire are shown to have important bearing of French 
intervention in Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
4.2 The Franco-Ivorian Colonial Legacy and its Consequences 
To understand France’s intervention in 2002 is to understand the colonial legacy of Franco-
Ivorian relations and how this legacy produced deep and intertwined linkages between France 
and Côte d’Ivoire. Certainly, the notion that France is more likely to intervene in its former 
colonies has been well documented throughout the literature.120 In complementing the literature, 
the quantitative findings in Chapter Three demonstrates how France is more likely to intervene in 
sub-Saharan African states which its shares a colonial history and/or a cultural and linguistic 
connection. In this section, I show that Côte d’Ivoire is no exception and, in fact, is France’s 
most important and symbolic former sub-Saharan African colony. Indeed, post-colonial Côte 
d’Ivoire, more so than other French colony, holds a special position in the eyes of the French, 
boasting a highly prised and privileged relationship. This section thus illustrates the strong 
colonial ties, and by extension post-colonial ties, which served as a precursor to French 
intervention in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, and which are indicative of general French motivations for 
intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
4.2.1 Strong Historic Roots 
Historically, France and Côte d’Ivoire have shared a lengthy and strong relationship. This 
relationship dates back to at least the 19th century, as French merchants established nascent trade 
relations with communities along the West African coast.121 As European states became 
increasingly more consumed with the acquisition of African colonies, France, being no 
exception, sought to solidify its relationship with political entities in West Africa. By steadily 
penetrating the African hinterland, France made substantial efforts to spread its influence and 
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dominance throughout the region.122 With the conclusion of the 1884 Berlin conference and the 
carving-up of Africa amongst the competing colonial power, France succeeded in obtaining huge 
portions of west and central Africa.123 By extension, Côte d’Ivoire was assimilated into the 
French empire, becoming an official French colony in 1893 and remaining firmly under the 
colonial jackboot of France until independence in 1960.124 
 
During the colonial era, France pushed for the development of Côte d’Ivoire, notably through the 
agricultural sector.125 Making use of abundant and fertile land, France transformed the largely 
subsistence societies in Côte d’Ivoire, introducing various crops within a plantation-based 
economy. Spearheading such transformation was the introduction of rubber, cocoa and coffee in 
the southern and western belts of Côte d’Ivoire and within a matter of decades these crops 
flourished to the extent that Côte d’Ivoire became the global leader in the production of cocoa as 
well as an important international player in the coffee trade.126 The rapid expansion of the 
agriculture sector proved to be most lucrative for the growing French settler population and, by 
extension, the French Empire, who dominated all sectors of the economy. 
 
Yet, the winds of change were in the air and by the 1950s domestic and international pressure 
spurred France into handing over power to its African colonies. Indeed, by 1960 France had 
almost overnight granted independence to most, if not all, its African colonies, including Côte 
d’Ivoire. While its colonies were officially independent, France continued to dominate, if not 
indirectly control, its former colonies. Coupled with clandestine and pseudo-legal dealings, 
hinging on entrenched personal connections between French and African elites, this post-colonial 
relationship or Françafrique, as it is commonly referred, appeared to be the norm in 
Francophone Africa. This was certainly the case for most of France’s former colonies, and 
indeed Côte d’Ivoire, which was often said to epitomise Françafrique.127 In fact, the Franco-
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49 
 
Ivorian relationship, above most other post-colonial relations, was deeply intertwined, proving to 
be the most important and strongest of these post-colonial ties. 
 
4.2.2 The Personal Connection 
One of the most important aspects which explain the proximate and intertwined Franco-Ivorian 
relationship was the entrenched personal relationships between French and Ivorian elites. This 
set of relationship was epitomised by Houphouët-Boigny, who, as the newly appointed President 
of Côte d’Ivoire, proved to be extremely useful to his French counterparts. During the colonial 
era, Houphouët-Boigny, often referred to as Le Vieux or Papa Houphouët, was portrayed as a 
charismatic leader who championed African development. By establishing the SSA (Syndicat 
Agricole Africain) in the 1940s, Houphouët-Boigny successfully campaigned for the end 
offorced labour, winning widespread support amongst Ivoirians.128 
 
Transforming the SSA into the PDCI (Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire), Houphouët-Boigny 
and associates began to challenge French rule in Côte d’Ivoire, albeit in a substantially more 
passive manner than other African liberation movements. By the 1950s, while demonstrating 
elements of anti-imperialism, Houphouët-Boigny, the PDCI and its inner circle had developed a 
distinctly pro-France attitude, and after serving at various levels and functions in the French 
colonial and national governments in the 1940s and 1950s developed strong ties and friendships 
with the French elite and proceeded to maintain these ties in the post-colonial era.129 
 
After assuming power upon independence in 1960, Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI continued 
to share a close relationship with the French elite, a relationship which saw both groups benefit 
immensely. Yet, as argued by McGovern, while the Ivorian elites catered to France’s interests, 
they were equally able to appease and co-opt the domestic constituency. Some suggest that this 
was a result of the political skills and manoeuvrings of Houphouët-Boigny himself who ensured 
that he retained key domestic support and thus stability. To be sure, Le Vine describes 
Houphouët-Boigny as a political mastermind who was adept at ‘juggling political institutions, 
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men, interests and power’ in such a way that his regime was considered a model of successful 
administrative-hegemonic power.130 
 
In this way, Houphouët-Boigny and his associates were able to maintain domestic control while 
serving French business and political interests.131 Indeed, Charbonneau, for example, describes 
this relationship as a ‘strategic alliance between Houphouët-Boigny, his entourage and 
France’,132 whereby the Ivorian elite was able to reap the rewards of buttressing French interests 
in Côte d’Ivoire, while distributing enough political and economicgoods so as to maintain 
domestic compliance and support. Similarly, Bossuroy and Cogneau argue that “Under 
President Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d’Ivoire established itself as the main partner of the former 
colonial power.133 The personal relationships of Houphouët-Boigny and his entourage with 
French elites were thus able to enhance and solidify the already entrenched Franco-Ivorian 
relationship over his 33 year reign of power. In this way, a nascent Côte d’Ivoire was born, with 
the crucial assistance of Houphouët-Boigny and company, into a deeply connected, if not 
dependent, relationship with the French metropole. 
 
This culture of strong personal linkages between Ivorian and French elites did not stop with 
Houphouët-Boigny. In fact, even after his death in 1993, Ivorian and French elites continued to 
share unusually strong connections. For example, Former President Gbagbo had strong links 
with French socialists in France, notably Former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and the leadership 
in the Parti Socialiste (PS).134 Similarly, current President Ouattara and Former President Nicolas 
Sarkozy have known each other for 20 years, with Ouattara reportedly stating: “If I had five or 
six friend in the world, he (Sarkozy) would be one of them”.135 Similar relationships have existed 
between Henri Konan Bédié, the successor of Houphouët-Boigny, and French elites, notably 
Michel Dupuch, and General Guéï, who after training in France, developed strong connections in 
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Image 1: French Military Bases in Africa (red dot) and defence 
agreements (2009) 
Source: http://www.eurotrib.com/story/2009/8/23/114055/036 
the French military establishment.136 The extent and nature of these deep relationships, which 
seem commonplace in Franco-Ivorian relations, have only enhanced the inter-connectedness and 
robustness of the Franco-Ivorian relationship, a relationship which has endured from 
independence to the present day. 
 
4.2.3 The French military in Côte d’Ivoire 
This special, even familial, relationship was 
supplemented by the strong military ties 
between France and Côte d’Ivoire. Côte 
d’Ivoire was among the first former French 
colonies to sign defence and military 
cooperation agreements with France,137 
effectively guaranteeing military support in 
times of domestic upheaval and external 
threats to Houphouët-Boigny’s regime. For 
instance, in 1971, the French military 
assisted Houphouët-Boigny in quelling a 
Bété uprising,138 which threatened the state 
with rebellion and secession.139 
 
As is the case with other former French colonies, these defence agreements effectively 
guaranteed the incumbents’ grip on power. Meanwhile, France benefitted by ensuring friendly 
regimes retain power through these internationally recognised defence agreements.140 
Furthermore, these agreements allowed French military personnel to be permanently stationed in 
military bases in Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, since independence France has constantly stationed 
hundreds of marines in the military base of Port Bouët, near Abidjan, marines who have offered 
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extensive training and assistance to their Ivorian counterparts and have assisted the Ivorian state 
in quelling domestic threats.141 
 
The permanent deployment of French troops in African countries is not ubiquitous. In fact, there 
are only a handful of African countries which host French troops on a permanent basis.142 Côte 
d’Ivoire is one such country, further illustrating its importance to France as well as highlighting 
the special Franco-Ivorian relationship made possible by the colonial ties between the two 
countries. Importantly, it was this base that served as the launching pad for Opération Licorne, as 
the convenience of having troops on the ground, outside Abidjan, ready to deploy at a moment’s 
notice, certainly affected President Chirac’s decision to intervene. 
 
In sum, the military agreements and permanent stationing of French marines in Côte d’Ivoire had 
assisted in maintaining the status quo in Côte d’Ivoire and have further solidified Franco-Ivorian 
relations. As noted by N’Diaye: ‘the PDCI owed most of its longevity to the presence of French 
troops and French military assistants’.143 In return, the permanent stationing of French troops in 
Côte d’Ivoire gave France important strategic and military advantages in West Africa, in many 
cases allowing France to use its military base as a launch pad for troop deployments into 
situations in the region at large. Côte d’Ivoire, as a result of its colonial ties with France, proved 
to be strategically and militarily vital to French interests. 
 
4.2.4 French émigrés and their importance 
This close relationship between Côte d’Ivoire and France can certainly explain the high level of 
mobility amongst French émigré to Côte d’Ivoire. While French expatriates can be found 
throughout much of Francophone Africa, Cote d’Ivoire has often been perceived as an attractive 
location, boasting relative political stability and consistent economic growth and development, 
with Abidjan often referred to as the ‘Paris of West Africa’.144 As such, the French expatriate 
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community in Côte d’Ivoire has historically been the largest of France’s former colonies in sub-
Saharan Africa.145 For example, Moncrieff notes that Cote d’Ivoire had constantly had the 
highest concentration of French nationals in Africa.146 Exact number of French émigrés residing 
in Côte d’Ivoire are hard to come by, but Staniland notes that in the 1980s, there were roughly 50 
000 French expatriates living in Côte d’Ivoire, substantially more than the second-largest French 
expatriate community in sub-Saharan Africa (20 000 expatriates in Senegal), while reports 
suggest that around 15-20 000 French nationals resided in Côte d’Ivoire before the outbreak of 
the 2002 civil war.147 
 
These nationals, many of whom were long-term residents and dual-citizenship holders, held a 
variety of positions in Cote d’Ivoire, including: teachers, senior-level advisors, coopérants,148 
and small-to-medium business owners. The large numbers of French expatriates and the tightly 
intertwined connections between French nationals and Ivorian society, as argued by Moncrieff, 
gave the French government a privileged position to understand and therefore influence Ivorian 
policy, with the French being almost ‘semi-insider’ to Ivorian politics and society.149 The 
historically close relationship allowed, if not encouraged, a large number of French nationals to 
reside and work in Cote d’Ivoire, solidifying the linkages between these states, further enhancing 
strong Franco-Ivorian linkages. 
 
In sum, this section has demonstrated the entrenched and intertwined post-colonial relations 
between France and Cote d’Ivoire. Strong historical relations, far-reaching personalties between 
French and Ivorian elites, strong military connections and reciprocations as well as a large 
French émigré population are all products of the strong colonial ties between France and Cote 
d’Ivoire. Together these factors create a myriad of important French interests in Cote d’Ivoire, 
interests which have their roots in the colonial legacy. As such, the notion developed in Chapter 
Three and substantiated in Chapter Three that France intervenes in its former colonies, to protect 
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its interests, is well substantiated in this section. I therefore concur with the likes of Charbonneau 
and Renou, to name a few, who contend that France intervenes in its former colonies, where it 
has vital interest that must be protected.150 
 
4.3 French Economic Interests in Cote d’Ivoire 
Besides colonial legacy and its impact on post-colonial relations and interests, strong economic 
interests, though certainly an important product of colonial legacy, are never far from the 
discussion of French interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, this argument was supported 
by the literature review in Chapter Two as well as the results from the large-N study in Chapter 
Three. With the case of Côte d’Ivoire, I find further support to the claim that France’s economic 
interests explain, at least partly, why France regards Côte d’Ivoire so highly and why perhaps 
France intervened in 2002. As such, the arguments in this section concur with scholars such as 
Charbonneau, Renou, Lemke and Regan, who contend that economic interests are vital 
determinants of interventions, and specifically intervention in Côte d’Ivoire.151 Similarly, it 
would seem that France’s economic interests, as a motive for intervention in Cote d’Ivoire, 
complement the analytical framework, and are thus indicative of the general trends of French 
motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
4.3.1 French Bilateral Trade 
One key aspect of the economic interest under discussion is Franco-Ivorian trade relations. 
France and Côte d’Ivoire have historically been close trade partners, especially in the post-
colonial era.152 Such a close trade relation connects states, increasing France interest in the 
domestic affairs and stability of the Côte d’Ivoire. Data from the PRIO dataset (Table 5) 
indicates that French trade relationships aresignificantly larger with Côte d’Ivoire (average: 
$1423.27 million per year) than with other African states that France didn’t intervene in 
(average: $178.18 million per year). Côte d’Ivoire thus seemingly fits well into the analytical 
framework; when trade relations are stronger and when such relations come under threat, France 
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is more likely to deploy troops to protect these interests. Furthermore, this data substantiates the 
argument that France shares a particularly close economic bond with Côte d’Ivoire, more so than 
other former French colonies.  
 
Table 5: PRIO Dataset: French Trade  ($Million) 
 Mean Measures of Association 
With Côte d’Ivoire $1423.27 Eta: .295 
P<.01 
With other African states  $178.18 
 
To further illustrate this point, IMI data supports similar findings (Table 6). Notably, French 
trade with Côte d’Ivoire, prior to the intervention, was significantly higher (average: $1027.52 
million) than trade relations between other interveners and target states (average: $89.73million). 
Furthermore, while these figures support the trade hypothesis, the fact that French trade with 
Côte d’Ivoire is far larger than with other states that France has intervened in (average $136.97 
million) indicates that France has a far more important relationship (economic and otherwise) 
with Côte d’Ivoire, even more so than other French colonies.  
 
Table 6: IMI Dataset: Intervener trade relations ($Million) 
 Mean Measures of Association 
France and Côte d’Ivoire $1027.52 P<.01 
Eta: .506 
 
France and target states  $136.97 




The case of Côte d’Ivoire thus complements the analytical framework from Chapter Three, 
highlighting that when trade ties are stronger, countries are more likely to intervene so as to 
protect such interests. In this way, my findings support the hypothesis of Stojek and Chacha, as 
well as others, who argued that economic interests in the form of bilateral trade connects states 
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together and any instability or conflict in one state threatens potential interveners’ trade relations 
with that state.153 As such, economic ties increase the willingness of states to intervene, 
especially when these ties are significantly stronger, as in the case of Côte d’Ivoire. 
4.3.2 Natural Resource Extraction 
Hitherto, the evidence has suggested that France important trading interests with Côte d’Ivoire. 
Another variable which has been argued to predict French intervention is the presence of 
important natural resources. Indeed, natural resources and France’s strategic need for them have 
been well documented in the literature, with scholars, notably Clark, Martin, and Wyss, 
suggesting that France has used it military power in sub-Saharan Africa to secure access to 
important resources like oil and uranium.154 Yet, it appears that interventions motivated by 
resources have been limited to a handful of resource-rich states, including CAR, Gabon, Congo-
Brazzaville and Niger. Some have even suggested that the 2013 Mali intervention was motivated 
to prevent conflict spill-over, a spill over that would threaten French uranium interests in 
Niger.155 
 
With regards to Côte d’Ivoire, there is little evidence to suggest that France sought intervention 
to secure strategically important resources. In fact, as noted by Charbonneau, two of the most 
important natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire, cocoa and the nascent oil industry, were not 
dominated by French business interests.156 Certainly, French interventions motivated by 
resources have taken place in sub-Saharan African. This, however, appears to be the exception 
rather than the rule. Moreover, the findings from Chapter Three suggest similar conclusions. To 
be sure, the evidence regarding natural resources and likelihood of French intervention is weak. 
In fact, the evidence suggests that France is less likely to intervene in sub-Saharan states with 
more natural resources. The lack of evidence regarding French motivation based on natural 
resources in Côte d’Ivoire thus complements the analytical framework of Chapter Three. 
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4.3.3 French Investment 
This high volume of bilateral trade highlights the strong and enduring connection between Côte 
d’Ivoire and France. While trade is certainly important in this analysis, it is by no means the 
only, or perhaps the most important, economic interest of France. In fact, there are other 
economic interests that could not be included in the Chapter Three, but which can be taken into 
account in this chapter, and which assist in developing a greater understanding of France’s 
interests in Côte d’Ivoire, and its subsequent intervention in 2002. For example, French direct 
investment to African states highlights the importance position of Côte d’Ivoire to French 
commercial interests. Table 7 shows the top six recipients of French direct investment between 
1989 and 2002, with Côte d’Ivoire placed as the fifth largest recipient of French investment. If 
we consider that France invests more in Africa’s largest economies (South Africa and Nigeria) 
and in Francophone countries endowed with substantial oil reserves (Gabon and Congo-
Brazzaville), we can see that Côte d’Ivoire, having a relatively small economy and oil reserves, 
is one of the largest recipients of French investment in Africa.  
 




South Africa 41.82 
Congo-Brazzaville 41.07 
Côte d’Ivoire 30.33 
Senegal 25.59 
 
Evidence further suggests that France, leading up to the intervention, was still the largest investor 
in Côte d’Ivoire, capitalising on a range of sectors that had recently been privatised. Indeed, 
French firms have long been present in Côte d’Ivoire, possessing important investments and 
controlling interests in various sectors in Côte d’Ivoire. Of note, France Télécom and Orange are 
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the biggest cellular companies in Côte d’Ivoire, French group Groupe Bolloré owned 67% of 
Sitarail which controlled the Ouagadougou-Abidjan rail, Air France controlled 51% of Air 
Ivoire, and Bouygues has large stakes in the electric company Ciprel and the Companie 
Ivorienne d’Électricité as well as the national water company SODECI. Moreover, French oil 
giants, Total and ELF, were part owners of Côte d’Ivoire’s oil refineries (Société Ivorienne de 
Raffinage) and French banks, notably BNP, Crédit Lyonnais and Société Général dominated the 
Ivorian banking sector.158 
 
Moreover, before the 2002 intervention there were roughly 500 small and medium sized 
enterprises, many of them owned and operated by French nationals residing in Côte d’Ivoire.159 
These enterprises made up approximately 30 percent of the Ivorian GDP and accounting for at 
least 50 percent of government revenue.160 The large amount of investment further highlights the 
economic importance of the Côte d’Ivoire to France. Thus, in agreement with Akindés, Côte 
d’Ivoire has historically been a prodigious recipient of French capital, capital which has been 
invested in a diverse range of sectors.161 As such, investment, like trade relations, further 
enhances the economic importance of the Franco-Ivorian relationship. French investment is thus 
another addition to the myriad of diverse French interests, which, when under threat, contributes 
to an understanding of why France intervened in 2002. 
 
4.3.4 French Aid to Côte d’Ivoire 
Besides trade and investment, Côte d’Ivoire has historically be a major recipient of French 
development aid, aid which has in effect greased the patrimonial wheels in Côte d’Ivoire and has 
been partly responsible for Côte d’Ivoire’s post-colonial economic growth, as well as the PDCI’s 
ability to maintain control and popular support.162 To illustrate, Côte d’Ivoire, on average, has 
received far higher levels of French aid when compared to all other sub-Saharan countries (see 
Table 8). Furthermore, amongst France’s former colonies as well as the Francophone community 
                                               
158 International Crisis Group,"Côte d’Ivoire: No Peace In sight", Africa Report no. 82 (2004), Dakar/Brussels; 
Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism, 155; Bovcon, "France’s Conflict Resolution", 14. 
159Bovcon, "France’s Conflict Resolution", 14 
160 Ibid 
161Francis Akindès, The roots of the military-political crises in Côte d'Ivoire, No. 128, (Nordic Africa Institute, 
2004):10 
162 Moncrieff, "French Development Aid", 147 
59 
 
in Africa, Côte d’Ivoire has received significantly larger quantities of development aid.163 
 
Table 8: French Official Development Assistance ($Million – Average 1960 to 2000)164 
Côte d’Ivoire Average 151.4 
Former Colonies 56.18 
 
Francophone Community 50.72 
African Average 25.39 
 
Like trade and investment, these figures suggest that Côte d’Ivoire and France have a particularly 
strong relationship, surpassing French relations with other sub-Saharan African states, including 
its former colonies and the Francophone community at large. Moncrieff corroborates such 
findings as he notes that ‘from independence to the late 1980s, France provided more than half 
Côte d’Ivoire’s net development aid receipts, while Côte d’Ivoire was consistently the highest 
recipient of French aid’.165 
 
French aid has benefitted not only Côte d’Ivoire, but the French as well. Indeed, Quinn and 
Simon argue that the allocation of French development aid has changed little over time and still 
appears to prioritise the French goals of projecting economic, diplomatic, political, and cultural 
power in Africa.166 Certainly the presence of vast French commercial and military interests in 
Côte d’Ivoire, and its symbolically close relationship with the Ivorian elite facilitated and 
justified the large flow of French aid to Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, the fact that Côte d’Ivoire receives 
higher levels of ODA than other sub-Saharan countries further substantiates the argument 
regarding the privileged and important position of Côte d’Ivoire in the eyes of the French.  
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4.3.5 The Franc Zone 
Côte d’Ivoire plays an important role in the regional economy and any domestic instability 
certainly has important economic implications for the greater region, as well as France. To be 
sure, Côte d’Ivoire is the largest economy amongst the eight-member Franc Zone (FZ) or CFA 
(Communauté Financière Africaine) in West Africa.167 This Franc Zone, held together by the 
Monetary Union of West African States (UEMOA), was pegged by the French Franc, and later 
the Euro.168 The importance of Côte d’Ivoire in holding this Union, and thus the Franc, together 
cannot be overstated. For example, according to one report, Côte d’Ivoire contributes more than 
40% of the UEMOA’s output.169 This importance means that any destabilisation or conflict in 
Côte d’Ivoire would send tremors throughout much of the region affecting the economies of 
Francophone West Africa. 
But more importantly are the impacts such domestic destabilisation would have on France and its 
Ivorian/regional economic interests. France, as the de-facto guarantor of the value of the FZ, has 
serious interests in ensuring the Union, and by extension Côte d’Ivoire, remains as stable as 
possible. To be sure, a wide range of scholars note how the FZ has traditionally been used by 
France to control and shape the economic policies of its former colonies, thereby ensuring its 
economic interests are protected.170 Charbonneau, for example, argues that this monetary regime 
gave France a position of privilege vis-à-vis the commercial and financial on-goings in the FZ.171 
Similarly, Martin suggests that the FZ gave Francenear-total control of money supplies, banking 
activities, credit allocations in what hedeemsa ‘voluntary’ surrender of sovereignty.172 France’s 
dominant role, evident in these arguments, isindicative of its economic interests in the region, of 
which there are many. Disaggregating back to the Ivorian case, France would (or could) not 
allow themost-important member of the FZ to descend into chaos and instability. In other words, 
it would seem unlike that, in light of these French economic interests previously outlined, France 
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would stand idly by and watch asits most important economic partner(in the UEMOA) descends 
into instability and conflict 
 
Bilateral trade, French investment, French aid and France’s regional economic interests 
demonstrate the economic importance of Côte d’Ivoire to France. Moreover, there is little 
evidence to suggest natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire were important in determining French 
intervention. In complementing the findings from Chapter Three, it seems that France, through 
this myriad of economic interests, intervened at least partly to defend such interests. The idea 
that France intervenes to protect its interests is certainly nothing new. Indeed, my findings 
support the arguments and observations of a range of scholars and commentators, especially 
regarding French economic motives for intervention.173 In light of these and other interests, and 
the rising threat to these interests in 2002, France felt compelled to intervene in Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
4.4 The deteriorating situation in Côte d’Ivoire 
There can be little doubt that such ‘structural’ interests aforementioned were present during the 
1999 coup d’état. Indeed, French interests in Côte d’Ivoire were as pronounced in 2002 as they 
were in 1999, yet France decided not to intervene in the latter as opposed to the former. This 
conundrum can partly be explained by events surrounding the 1999 coup d’état, notably Jospin’s 
interdiction and perhaps the perception of Guéï as guarantor of French interest. Yet, in 2002, 
there were a series of events and factors in France and Côte d’Ivoire which complement the 
colonial legacy and economic explanations of French intervention, providing additional 
understanding to why France intervened.  
 
Of note, the attempted coup on 19 September, although failing to remove Gbagbo from power, 
threw Cote d’Ivoire into the midst of civil war. The well-armed and well-trained FN troops 
proved to match, if not overwhelm, Gbagbo’s forces, resulting in the rapid take-over of northern 
territory. For France, the 2002 attempted coup and the rebel’s swift assimilation of north territory 
was seen as evidence of the degradation of the Ivorian state and the burgeoning inability of the 
state to maintain order and territorial integrity.  
                                               





France’s myriad of aforementioned interests in Côte d’Ivoire meant thatit could simply not allow 
such deterioration to occur. To be sure, in December 2002, the Foreign Minister Dominique de 
Villepin stated that the role of the French military was to stabilise the situation and that one of 
the fundamental objectives of Opération Licorne was without doubt to prevent a bloodbath akin 
to that of Rwanda in 1994.174 Similarly, the Defence Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie, in an 
address to the French National Assembly, stated that France’s objective was to stabilise the 
situation until the arrival of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) forces.175 
As such, government rhetoric consistentlyphrasedthe intervention as geared towards “using force 
to achieve peace”, “to master violence was desirable to achieve peace” and “a show of forces 
avoids resorting to force”.176 Moreover, the official mandate of the intervention wasgeared 
towards the establishment of ‘the necessary conditions for the search for a political solution’ and 
‘to allow Ivoirians to define political solutions’.177 This official discourse and mission objectives 
all point to France’s need to stabilise the worsening situation and stop the crisis from spiralling 
out of control. 
 
These motives for intervention further complement the analytical framework, notably with 
regards to the intensity of the conflict. It was shown in Chapter Three that France is more likely 
to intervene in low-intensity conflicts and crises, where there are fewer casualties. The rapid 
French deployment in Côte d’Ivoire, before the conflict escalated and produced greater 
bloodshed, is reflective of the general trends that France’s interventions in low-casualty conflicts. 
Certainly the notion that France sought to prevent a Rwanda-styled crisis occurring in Côte 
d’Ivoire is evident in its intervention. That is to say, if scholars, who argue that the consequences 
of the Rwandan genocide has severely affected the beliefs and attitudes of French policy-makers, 
are correct, then France’s intervention, before the Ivorian crisis escalated into full scale war, can 
be at least partly explained by its willingness to prevent mass-scale bloodshed akin to Rwanda in 
1994. As such, on face-value, the intervention complements not only the analytical framework 
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but also various scholars, notably Smith, Charbonneau and Bovcon, who suggest that France’s 
intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was motivated by humanitarian objectives.178 
 
Yet, this need to re-establish order and stability in Côte d’Ivoire cannot be divorced from the 
historical close relations these countries share. Indeed, had French relations, and consequent 
interest, with Côte d’Ivoire been of lesser, or of no, value there is reasonable doubt as to whether 
France would have intervened. The deep and integrated nature of Franco-Ivorian relations, in 
effect, left France in a position where it could not simply sit quietly by and watch the Ivorian 
state disintegrate. As such, the deteriorating situation and France’s myriad of interests in Côte 
d’Ivoire meant that France really did have something to lose. While disguised as a purely 
humanitarian affair, France’s engagement in the crisis could not escape it historical responsibility 
and its deep-seated interests in Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, Alliot-Marie in 2002 declared that France 
was right to intervene given the historic links and close relations between the two countries.179In 
such ways, arguments put forth by Dowty and Loescher, regarding interventions justified on 
humanitarian grounds but usually motivated by more cynical factors, resonatein the case of 
intervention in Côte d’Ivoire.180 While there are certainly elements of humanitarian motive in 
France’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, it would seem that France’s was driven more by the 
protection of its myriad of interests, which demanded stability, as opposed to a purely 
humanitarian intervention. 
 
Perhaps of most immediate concern to French decision-makers was the very real danger that 
French nationals, residing in Côte d’Ivoire, faced. As such, one of the fundamental objectives of 
the intervention was protecting and evacuating French and other foreign nationals. Indeed, 
Charbonneau notes that on the first day, France deployed its 600 permanently-stationed troops to 
protect French, American and other foreign nationals.181 Similarly, the French Foreign minister 
on several occasion highlighted the need toprotect and evacuateFrench and other foreign 
émigrés,182 while Bovcon argues that ‘France legitimised its action in terms of its duty to protect 
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French citizens on the territory of another country when their lives are threatened and the host 
country is incapable of, or unwilling to, provide for their security’.183 Thus, in the following 
months France evacuated thousands of French national, including some 3000 nationals from the 
rebel-held areas in northern Côte d’Ivoire.184 Certainly, in light of the deteriorating situation, the 
argument that France intervened so as to protect the thousands of French émigrés residing in 
Côte d’Ivoire is important in understanding its motives. 
 
The growing strength of the rebels in the north threatened to throw Côte d’Ivoire into a 
protracted and violent civil war, a threat that simply was not present in 1999. Given the myriad 
of French ‘structural’ interests in Côte d’Ivoire, and in light of the deteriorating situation and 
France’s need to protect its interests and citizens, France had little choice but to intervene. Had 
Jospin been in power in 2002, and given the very threat of civil war and escalation of violence, 
one could make the argument that even he would have had to have acted, in contradiction to his 
policy of disengagement. 
 
4.5 Chirac and Gbagbo: An uneasy Relationship 
4.5.1 Chirac the Gaul 
A further aspect of why France intervened is located within the political climate of both France 
and Côte d’Ivoire. In May 2002, Chirac was re-elected President of France. Moreover, his 
conservative party won a majority in the French legislature, putting an end to the cohabitation of 
1997-2002.185 The defeat of Jospin’s Socialists gave Chirac a mandate and by extension allowed 
him to return France to a policy of active reengagement in African crises.186 Underpinning such 
reengagement were Chirac’s Gaullist beliefs and attitudes vis-à-vis France’s role in Africa.187 
Indeed, Chirac, whose career dates back to the De Gaulle Presidency, sought to reaffirm France’s 
role as the traditional power in Africa, embedding France in the affairs of its former colonies. 
Chirac’s long affairs with Africa, dating back to his time of civil service in Algeria further 
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solidified his neo-Gaullist beliefsand from his first election victory in 1995 Chirac continued to 
make several trips to Africa.188 
 
The end of cohabitation was an important development regarding French intervention in Cote 
d’Ivoire. As stated by Banégas: For the new government, the inaction in the period 1997-2002 
contributed greatly to the current African crises… it is therefore necessary for France to 
(re)‘take responsibility’ and if need be become involved in military operations in Africa.189 
Indeed, Chirac and his entourage had little qualmwith the use of military force in order to secure 
French interests and reassert traditional French power in Africa. Breaking away from Jospin’s 
“neither interference no indifference” policy, Chirac thus sought to reengage with Africa and 
reassert France as an important actor in African, and global,conflict resolution.  
 
As such, France, in a classic Gaullist sense, saw in its pré carré, and by extension Côte d’Ivoire, 
the means through which it could promote its diplomatic power and thus relevance on the 
international stage.190 By becoming involved in important international crises, like in Côte 
d’Ivoire, and attempting to resolve such crises, France is essentially able to demonstrate how it 
still remains an important and relevant player on the international scene. After the end of 
cohabitation, the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire thus proved to be the litmus test of Chirac’s policy of 
reengagement in Africa and Chirac would finally get his chance to intervene in Cote d’Ivoire, 
something that he was arguably denied in 1999.191 As such, the evidence tends to suggest that the 
arguments put forth by Banégas, N’Daiye and Pascallon, concerning Chirac thought making 
process, are important in understanding why France launched its intervention.192 
 
4.5.2 Gbagbo: An uneasy relationship? 
Meanwhile, in Cote d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbowould find in Chirac a cold, if not hostile 
counterpart. Gbagbo and his Front Populaire Ivorian (FPI), with roots in the socialist 
movement,found natural allies amongst French and international Socialists. Indeed, Gbagbo is 
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often said to have had good relations with Jospin’s and his Parti Socialiste (PS).193 Conversely, 
the relationship between Gbagbo and Chirac was luke-warm at best, and only deteriorated as the 
intervention continued, notably after the 2004 destruction of the Ivorian Air Force and repression 
of Ivorian protestors by French forces. From the beginning, Gbagbo and company viewed French 
military efforts in Cote d’Ivoire as a direct threat.194 Indeed, various scholars note how mutual 
levels of suspicion and mistrust existed and deepened between Chirac and Gbagbo.195 
 
For Gbagbo and his supporters, Chirac and his right-wing entourage, notably within the Élysée’s 
African cell, were increasingly seen as having a neo-colonialist agenda.196 This outlook was 
largely championed by Gbagbo’s ‘young patriots’ under the leadership of Mamadou Koulibaly 
and Charles Blé Goudé, who rallied around an anti-colonialist and anti-French discourse.197 For 
Chirac, the idea of having Gbagbo controlling France’s most important former sub-Saharan 
colony did not sit well with him or his conservative entourage.198 Smith goes as far as to say that: 
‘in power, Gbagbo was France’s postcolonial nemesis, playing a role very similar to the one 
Mugabe has played in relation to Britain’.199 
 
In hindsight, given the fact that France was instrumental in removing Gbagbo from power in 
2011, one can certainly argue that it was France’s objective from the beginning to remove 
Gbagbo from power.For many, the uneasy and mistrustful relationship between Chirac and 
Gbagbo (and latter Chirac’s successor Sarkozy), was further indication of Chirac’s real objective 
in Cote d’Ivoire: the removal of Gbagbo. Yet, the evidence leading up to the 2002 intervention 
and during the initial months of the intervention does not fullysupport either argument. Certainly, 
the luke-warm Chirac-Gbagbo relationship, France’s refusal to assist Gbagbo (defence 
agreements) and arguments that France indirectly legitimised the north-based rebels are all 
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indicative of Chirac’s hostility to the Gbagbo regime.200 Yet, if Chirac and his inner circle truly 
sought to remove Gbagbo from office, there is little doubt that France possessed the military 
capabilities to do so.201 And yet, as we have seen, France chose to remain officially impartial 
from September 2002, suggestingthe removal of Gbagbo was perhaps not the initial objective of 
Opération Licorne. 
 
The rise of Chirac right-wing party translated into France actively reengaging in African affairs. 
His traditional Gaullist beliefs guided such reengagement and France sought to re-create itself as 
the great power of yester-year. Cote d’Ivoire thus proved to be Chirac’s first test for this 
reengagementand he responded according deploying thousands of troops in the deteriorating 
situation. While evidence indicates Chirac’s hostility towards Gbagbo, it remains unclear 
whether France sought, from the outset, to remove him from power.  
 
4.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has sought to explain why France’s intervened in 2002 in Cote d’Ivoire. Moreover, 
using the analytical framework developed in Chapter Three, this chapter strove to understand the 
extent to which France’s motives for intervention in Cote d’Ivoire differed from the general 
trends of French motives for intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In answering these questions 
this chapter firstly analysedtwo of the most notable variables from the quantitative analysis, 
colonial legacy and economic interests, and applied them to the Franco-Ivorian relations and the 
consequent intervention in 2002. Secondly, this chapter showed how the perceived deterioration 
situation in Côte d’Ivoirefurther influenced French intervention. Lastly, this chapter analysed the 
political dynamics in France and Côte d’Ivoire, showing how they contributed to the 2002 
intervention. 
 
In summation, I have shown how France’s 2002 intervention in Cote d’Ivoire resulted from a 
number of structural French interests as well as several immediate reasons. Of note,colonial ties 
between France and Cote d’Ivoire have produced strong personal connections between French 
and Ivorian elites, entrenched military connections, and a large French émigré community in 
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Cote d’Ivoire. Of the economic interests, I conclude that France has important trade, investment 
and aid relations with Cote d’Ivoire. Moreover, the importance of Cote d’Ivoire to the regional 
economy was further shown to be important to French economic interests in Cote d’Ivoire. I 
further demonstrated that while France has historically intervened to secure access to natural 
resources in sub-Saharan Africa, there is little evidence that this was the case in Cote d’Ivoire. 
Moreover, these causes of French intervention in Cote d’Ivoire have been shown to be largely 
indicative of typical French interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, in accordance with 
scholars such as Lemke and Regan, France had wide-ranging and deep-seated interests in Cote 
d’Ivoire, interests which it needs to protect.202 
 
Yet, events in 2002, as opposed to 1999, set the stage for French intervention. Certainly, the 
deteriorating situation in Cote d’Ivoire and France’s need to protect the large French population 
explain France’s initial deployment of troops. Indeed, the rapid deployment of French troops, 
before the crisis became increasingly violent, is largely in line with the intensity finding in 
Chapter Three, thus demonstrating further the resemblance of the Ivorian intervention to general 
French interventions. In other words, the French intervention, occurring before the situation 
deteriorated and descended into mass violence, is consistent with the general trends of French 
intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. Events in Rwanda as well as France’s infamous role in the 
wholesale slaughter of Rwandans, has certainly had an effect on the perceptions of French policy 
makers. The rapid intervention in Cote d’Ivoire highlights such perceptions of fear and France’s 
need to ensure such acts of brutality do not happen again. Recent interventions in Mali and CAR 
further demonstrate the French urge to intervene in historically-close former colonies to ensure 
that events akin to the Rwandan genocide never happen again.  
 
But perhaps more important were the political dynamics occurring in France. Of note, Chirac re-
election, and his Gaullist underpinnings, translates into France’s active reengagement in Africa’s 
domestic affairs. Indeed, these conclusions resonate with a plethora of scholars, who have 
contended that the Gaullist underpinnings of French-African policy have led to France actively 
engaging and intervening in Africa’s internal affairs.203 The fact that Cote d’Ivoire was becoming 
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increasingly unstable, in light of France’s structural interests, provided Chirac with adequate 
motive to deploy troops. Unlike Jospin and company, Chirac is a product of traditional Gaullist 
beliefs who advocates for France to maintain its traditional role in Africa affairs, yet there is 
doubt as to whether even the progressive Jospin could have remained disengaged from the 
Ivorian crisis. The permanent presence of troops in Cote d’Ivoire, a legacy of Gaullist policies, 
only meant that decision to intervene was all the more easier. 
 
Lastly, while there is noteworthy evidence to suggest that Chirac viewed Gbagbo with mistrust 
and suspicion, its remains unclear as to whether France’s initial intervention in 2002 was geared 
towards removing him from power. Certainly, events in 2011 have spurred a number of 
commentators to suggest a French neo-colonialist agenda in Cote d’Ivoire, and indeed there is 
certainly merit to this argument. Yet, it remains unclear if this was France’s initial objective to 
remove him from power. More likely, Cote d’Ivoire offered to Chirac the setting for which he 
could reengage with African crises, promoting France as a natural and logical mediator in 
African crises. The extreme importance of Cote d’Ivoire to France further compelled France to 
intervene in attempts to stabilise the situation, which is what France did through the zone de 
confiance, and thus protect its interests. 
 
In sum, France’s 2002 intervention in Côte d’Ivoire resonates strongly with the general trends of 
French intervention in sub-Saharan and is indeed indicative of these trends. Therefore, the 
importance of France’s interests cannot be divorced from understanding why it intervened in 
Côte d’Ivoire. As such, this chapter has adequately answer the research question: Why did 
France intervene in 2002 in  Côte d’Ivoire and to what extent does France’s intervention in Côte 






The key objective of this thesis was to understand why France intervened in 2002 in Côte 
d’Ivoire. The fact that France was so hasty in deploying troops to the West African nation is all 
the more puzzling given the apparent disengagement from meddling in African affairs andthe 
fundamental reforms in French Africa policy leading up to the intervention. This thesis thus 
sought to reengage with questions pertaining to French motives for intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Moreover, in light of French policy shifts vis-à-vis Africa, this thesis strove to understand, firstly, 
the general trends of French motivations for interventions and secondly, the degree to which 
France’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire differs or resembles these trends. While some argue that 
France was restructuring its actions in sub-Saharan Africa, other contends that this restructuring 
is nothing more than “old wine in new bottles”. In response, this thesis engaged with this 
disjuncture in the literature and sought to understandthe extent to which French intervention in 
Côte d’Ivoireindeed represented substantial policy shifts vis-à-vis Africa or whether the 
intervention is just history repeating itself. 
The review of the literature in Chapter Two highlights some important, yet contradictory, 
arguments regarding why France decided to intervene in 2002. Indeed, there are various schools 
of thought which offer contrasting views about the intervention. Some suggest that French 
intervention in Côte d’Ivoire can be explained by realist and Gaullist assumptions in which 
intervention occurred as aresult of France’s Gaullist underpinnings and its need to project power 
both in sub-Saharan Africa and internationally.Similar arguments of a self-interested nature 
suggest that France was merely pursuing a neo-colonial agenda in Côte d’Ivoire, centred on its 
economic interests, whereby France’s has done what it always does, intervenes to protect its 
interests. Yet, other arguments contend that France’s intervention was motivated by 
humanitarian concerns in Côte d’Ivoire in which France needed to prevent violence and 
bloodshed.  
In seeking to answer the research questions and locating my thesis within the current state of 
knowledge, I began by developing a quantitative framework which tested various literature-
based hypotheses. Using the PRIO dataset, as well as gathering data for several other sources, I 
developed a multivariate analysis testing the individual effects of the independent variables on 
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the likelihood of French intervention. Through this rigorous analysis I developed an analytical 
framework which outlined the general trends of French intervention. In sum, I found that French 
intervention in sub-Saharan Africa tends to take place either in a former French colony, with 
which it shares close historical ties with, or in a Francophone country, with which it shares 
linguistic and cultural ties. Moreover, France is in general more likely to intervene in either a 
former colony or Francophone countries with which it shares strong bilateral trade relations, and 
by extension economic relations. Lastly, France tends to intervene in low-intensity situations and 
crises, in which the death toll, and by extension intensity, is relatively small compared to other 
conflicts. 
 
Through this analysis, I concluded that the variables testing self-interested motives were stronger 
predictors of French intervention in sub-Saharan Africa than variables of a humanitarian nature. 
As aforementioned, this could be due to the unreliability of the data; yet more likely is the notion 
that the results are a true reflection of the nature and motives of French intervention in sub-
Saharan Africa. These preliminary finding thus concur with the argument of Choi: ‘interventions 
are simply another foreign policy tool used for pursuing national interests, such as securing the 
supply of oil or extending power interests’.204 Similarly, the evidence in the quantitative analysis 
shares many commonalities with self-interested arguments put forth in the literature review. 
From this chapter, it became evident that an understanding of French intervention in sub-Saharan 
Africa requires an understanding of France’s historical relationship with and its interests, of 
which there are many, in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
In Chapter Four, I focused on the 2002 intervention in Côte d’Ivoire and strove to understand 
French motives for this intervention. Moreover, I incorporated the findings of the quantitative 
analysis in attempts to know the extent to which French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire differs 
from the general trends of intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. In conclusion, the case of the 
French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire appears to strongly complement the quantitative 
conclusionsin Chapter Three. As I have shown, France’s historic and close relationship is a 
defining feature of French interests in Côte d’Ivoire and is crucial in explaining intervention in 
                                               




2002. A closely related feature of these relationships and interests are France’s economic 
interests in Côte d’Ivoire, which are extensive and are indicative of France’s larger interests in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, France’s colonial ties, personal connections, military presence, large 
French émigrés population as well as strong economic interests represent some of its most 
important interests in Côte d’Ivoire, interests which when under threat compelled France to 
intervene. Moreover, the perceived deterioration of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, coupled with 
France’s need to protect its citizens residing in Côte d’Ivoire go a long way in explaining French 
intervention. As such, this almost pre-emptive intervention is indicative for the notion that 
France intervenes in low-intensity situations, perhaps in efforts to prevent bloodshed akin to the 
Rwanda genocide. 
The comparison between the general and the specific, demonstrated in Chapter Four, thus 
indicates that French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire is indeed history repeating itself. To be sure, 
French motives for intervention in Côte d’Ivoire have not significantly changed with regards to 
the use of military force in sub-Saharan Africa. In responding to the current state of knowledge, 
the plethora of scholars, who contend that French interventionsin Côte d’Ivoire and elsewhere 
are primarily motivated by self-interested factor, are supported by this thesis.205 While, on face 
value, at least, there have been some important restructuring of French policy towards Africa, the 
underlying motives for France military engagements appears to remain consistently perverse.  
The reclaiming of power by Chirac’s conservatives only exacerbated the nature and motives of 
French military action in Côte d’Ivoire and sub-Saharan Africa. Had Jospin clung to power in 
2002, there is doubt as to whether, given the myriad of French interests and the deteriorating 
situation in Côte d’Ivoire, he would have been able to continue to disengage from African 
affairs. Indeed in recent history, Jospin protégé, François Hollande, after repeatedly claiming he 
would follow in the footsteps of Jospin and continue to reform French policy toward Africa, was 
compelled to intervene in Mali (2013) and CAR (2013), largely due to historical responsibility 
and entrench linkages resembling the case of Côte d’Ivoire. It thus seems that the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire is indicative of French relations and military engagements with sub-Saharan African 
states that it shares a particularly close and historically significant relationship. As such, despite 
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what French leaders say and do, France cannot seem to keep out of meddling in African affairs. 
When very real and important interests are threatened, France cannot disengage from protecting 
those interests, despite wide-ranging policy reforms and normative rhetoric emanating from 
every new regime in France. 
Looking to the future, the growing importance of multilateral organisations in conflict resolution 
and the reducing feasibility and costs of bilateral interventions will compel France to continue to 
restructure its role insub-Saharan Africa. Evidence of this restructuring can already be seen in the 
France’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, in which France, supported by the UN and ECOWAS, 
sought to remedy the situation. More recently, France’s willingness to cooperate with regional 
and global bodies in Mali (2013) and CAR (2013) are further indications of the increased 
multilateralisation and Africanisation of its conflict resolution agenda. France will thus need to 
continue to adapt to these changing norms if it seeks to remain a relevant and important actor in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Failure to do so will result in the withering of French power in sub-Saharan 
Africa and as noted by Former French President Francois Mitterrand: ‘Without Africa, France 
will have no history in the 21st century’.206 
Yet, even if this becomes the case, this thesis has demonstrated that French motives for 
intervention are resilient and, despite rhetoric and policy shifts, appear to remain centred on 
influence and domination of its former colonies and beyond. France’s continuing need to remain 
relevant, and its consistent usage of sub-Saharan Africa to do so, appears to be a defining feature 
of its political culture and foreign policy. More so than Britain or Portugal, France continues to 
maintain particularly strong relations with its traditional sphere of influence. These relations 
have tended to shape France’s symbolic and tangible interests in the region which have, by 
extension, compelled France to remain militarily engaged in African crises. 
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Appendix 1: PRIO Dataset variables 
 
Indicators Type Coding Source 
French 
Intervention 
Continuous Coded as 0 if France intervened 
and 1 if there was no French 
intervention 
Kisangani, EF & Pickering, J. 2008. 
International Military Interventions, 1989-
2005. Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research, Data 
Collection, No. 21282, University of 




Continuous The total amount in US dollars 




Dyadic Trade Continuous Total amount of trade in Millions 
US$ 






Categorical Coded as 0 if the state is a former 
French colony and 1 if it was not. 
Hensel, PR. 2014. ICOW Colonial History 




Categorical Coded as 0 if the state uses French 
as a language and 1 if it does not 
List of the Francophonie countries where 





Categorical Coded as 1 if the conflict 
produced less than 1000 total 
deaths and 0 if there were more 
than 1000 deaths 
Found in the PRIO dataset: Gleditsch, Nils 
Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, 
Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, 
2002. ‘Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New 





Continuous Coded as total number (x1000) of 
people who were forcibly 
removed. 
Data accessed from the U.S Committee for 






Continuous Coded on a scale of -10 to +10: 
From autocratic regime to 
democratic regime 
Marshall, M; Gurr, T & Jaggers, K. 2014. 
Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013. 
Centre for Systematic Peace. [Available at: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manu






Continuous Coded in US$, GDP per capita is 
calculated by dividing the state’s 
GDP by its population 
World Bank. 2015b. GDP per Capita 
(current US$) [Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP
.PCAP.CD, Accessed 26/06/2015] 
Cold War Categorical Coded as 1 if the conflict occurred 
during the cold war and 0 if it was 
after the cold war. The Cold War 
ended in December 1991. 
Author found the date in which the Cold 
War officially ended (26 December 1991) 









Appendix 2: French Interventions in Africa (IMI) on in PRIO dataset 
 
Year Target Country Type of Action (as noted by the IMI dataset) 
1960 Cameroon Anti-Rebel--NYT/LeVine 
1960 Chad Admin. North--Pittman 
1964 Gabon Abort Coup/G.Army-NYT/G.Hist 
1968 Chad Back Govt.-Pittman/ARB/NYT 
1977 Chad Transport Chad Troops-NYT 
1977 DRC Shaba I-ARB/NYT/Keesings 
1977 Mauritania Polis.-WldAlm/T&A/NYT/Hgs/Kees 
1978 Chad Oppose Rebel/Evac.-NYT/ARB 
1978 DRC ShabaII-NYT/ACR/Keesings 
1983 Chad Support Habre--ARB 
1986 Chad Oppose Libyans--ARB/NYT 
1989 Comoros France sends troops and naval vessels to take control of Comoros security 
1990 Chad 
France sends limited reinforcement to Chad to aid in repelling Libyan 
invasion 
1990 Rwanda France defends Rwandan government from rebel attack 
1991 Chad French intervenes in Chad to protect French nationals 
1992 Djibouti France mobilised garrison force in Djibouti 
1992 Somalia French troops land in Somalia on humanitarian mission 
1993 Rwanda 
French troops sent to Rwanda to reinforce existing troops and protect and 
evacuate French nationals 
1994 Rwanda French Operation Turquoise  
1996 CAR France intervenes in internal conflict in the Central African Republic 
1997 Congo 
France evacuates foreigners and citizens as part of the "Pelican Operation" in 
Congo 
1997 Sierra Leone France evacuates diplomats from Sierra Leone 
1998 Eritrea France airlifts foreign nationals from Eritrea capital 
1998 Guinea-Bissau France evacuates nationals from Guinea-Bissau 
1999 Ivory Coast French aid ousted Ivory Coast president after coup 
2002 Ivory Coast French troops safeguard foreigners in Ivory Coast 
2003 CAR 
France sends troops to evacuate citizens and help stabilise Central African 
Republic following a coup 
2003 Liberia France evacuates foreign nationals from Liberia 
2004 Chad 
France provides humanitarian aid and protection for Sudanese refugees 
fleeing to Chad 
 
 
 
 
